A

LETTER

TO

H. M. DURAND, Esq., C.S.I.,

FROM

MAJOR EVANS BELL.

A LETTER

TO

H. M. DURAND, Esq., C.S.I.,

OF THE BENGAL CIVIL SERVICE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW;

FROM

MAJOR EVANS BELL,

LATE OF THE MADRAS STAFF CORPS;

AUTHOR OF "LAST COUNSELS OF AN UNKNOWN COUNSELLOR", "THE OXUS AND THE INDUS", "RETROSPECTS AND PROSPECTS OF INDIAN POLICY", ETC.

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NOTICE.

I wish to explain, in as few words as possible, that although the publication of this Letter is forced upon me by a personal attack, it is not merely to a personal controversy, or to a private grievance, that I ask public attention. I claim to represent the interests of the Empire in opposition to Mr. H. M. Durand, who champions the interests of a family, a class, and a profession.

A Prince of the Empire, marked out by the Imperial Government in 1858 as one of the intended recipients of "honorary distinctions" and "territorial grants", in reward for services rendered during the rebellion, has received no reward at all, and has, on the contrary, been treated with contumely and calumny. Against this treatment he has continuously protested, more especially since its renewal in 1870, but without obtaining redress.

The only Resident at a Native Court of any consequence who broke down completely in the crisis of 1857 was Colonel (afterwards Sir Henry) Durand, in charge of the Residency at Indore, Holkar's capital, during the absence of Sir Robert Hamilton. He was so blind as to what was passing close to his own doors; so neglectful of friendly intercourse with the Court and its notabilities; so arrogantly regardless of Native counsels and opinions, that a combined attack by mutineers in our service and in that of Holkar took him quite by surprise, forced him to leave the Residency, and to take refuge in the British station of Hoshungabad. Here he jumped to the conclusion that Holkar was implicated in the revolt; declared, in the style of Napoleon, "The dynasty of Holkar has ceased to reign", and denounced the Maharajah's "Mahratta treachery" in his despatches. But at that very time the Maharajah was co-operating most gallantly with the English gentlemen who had taken up Colonel Durand's duties during his unlucky retirement. Colonel Durand would give no credit to Holkar or to any of his own brother officers for what was done while he was absent from the scene. He ever afterwards acted as if any acknowledgment on his part of Holkar's good influence and services would leave his own failure and flight without excuse. Circumstances placed him for eleven years in a position to prevent any redress of the injustice done to the Maharajah. His Assistants and successors at Calcutta have always made common cause with him, as English officials generally incline to do where the appellant, even though he may

be a Prince, is "only a Native". In the words of Sir John Kaye, the historian of the *Sepoy War*, "Holkar was sacrificed to Durand". I will add, and I will prove, that the authority, the dignity, and the honour of the Empire, have been sacrificed to sustain the interests and the credit of "the Office" and "the Service".

I will now give, in the most striking and succinct form that suggests itself to me, a brief hint and outline of the hitherto unequal contest that has been going on, in this matter, between

IMPERIAL INSTRUCTIONS AND OFFICIAL OBSTRUCTIONS. 1858-1860.

Lord Stanley (now Earl of Derby) President of the Board of Control, writes as follows (through the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors), on the 28th of July 1858, to the Governor-General :—

"We desire that you will, as expeditiously as possible, furnish us with a list of those Princes, Chiefs, and others, who have distinguished themselves by acts of fidelity and friendship to the British Government, together with a statement of their services, and of your views with respect to the best means of rewarding them, whether by territorial grants, by pensions or gratuities, or by honorary distinctions.

"The first of these modes would doubtless be the most acceptable to those whom we desire to gratify.

"High on the list you will, we feel assured, place the names of Scindia, HOLKAR, the Nizam, and the King of Nepaul."

In a despatch, dated 31st December 1858, Lord Stanley, Secretary of State for India, observes that he is waiting for a reply to the letter just quoted, and adds :

"I trust no long time will elapse before I receive from your Lordship further reports of the same kind, including the names of the more influential Princes of India, especially those of the Maharajahs Scindia and HOLKAR, and of his Highness the Nizam."

Territorial rewards were conferred upon "Scindia, the Nizam, and the King of Nepaul". But with regard to the fourth Prince, "high on the list" of those whom Her Majesty's Government "desired to gratify", the Viceroy, Lord Canning, in a despatch dated January 16th, 1860, wrote as follows :—

"It is not my intention to propose that his Highness" (the Maharajah HOLKAR) "should receive any gift of territory. His conduct on the day on which his troops mutinied and attacked the Residency at Indore was not such as to command either the respect or the gratitude of the British Government."

This dishonouring and insulting sentence was not preceded, accompanied, or followed by any justification or explanation.

1864.

Her Majesty's Government, having never been told why Holkar was blamed and unfavourably distinguished from the other Princes in the list, Sir John (now Lord) Lawrence, soon after his arrival as Viceroy at Calcutta, receives from Sir Charles Wood (now Lord Halifax), Secretary of State, a letter dated 4th of July 1864, inquiring why no reward had been conferred on the Maharajah Holkar, and asks for information from the "Office".

In answer to Sir John Lawrence's requisition, Colonel Durand, now Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, sends up a secret "Office-note", dated August 4th, 1864, to the Viceroy in Council, with these words:—

"Holkar has got all that Lord Canning thought he should get. He was, also, given the Star of India—why, no one could ever make out—and it deteriorated the value of the decoration in the eyes of those who, like the Begum of Bhopal, knew Holkar's conduct."

These remarks, as will be shown more fully and clearly in my Letter, are at once unmannerly and unmeaning. They were accompanied by no explanatory statement.

1870.

The Earl of Mayo, Viceroy of India, unable to account for Holkar's disgrace and forfeiture, asks for information from "the Office".

In answer to Lord Mayo's requisition, the Foreign Secretary, Mr. (now Sir Charles) Aitchison sends up a secret "Office-note", dated 5th August 1870, of which the following is an extract:—

"Holkar did not, at the first burst of the mutiny, take that open and decided part with us that he ought to have done. The attack upon the Indore Residency occurred on the 1st July 1857. It was not till the 5th that he took any decided steps to show with which cause he intended to throw in his lot."

"On the 5th of July the Maharajah, and not before, sent a deputation to Mhow to express his regret at what had occurred."

This was the first intelligible charge that had ever been made against the Maharajah Holkar, and it is entirely false. It has no foundation in any official report, and it is contradicted by official reports on record.

My lamented friend, John Dickinson, had occupied himself for

years with Indian politics, as other men of large means and abundant leisure may take up horse-racing, numismatics, or entomology. He had a friendly correspondent, Captain Fenwick, in Holkar's service,* and thus became acquainted, from day to day, with all the incidents of the rebellion, and with all the perverse influences by which the Maharajah Holkar's character was maligned and his life embittered. Mr. Dickinson worked at the redress of this great wrong until his death, and left it as a legacy to me, previous arrangements having been made so that I should be enabled on occasion, and as opportunity offered, to give some time to the very unprofitable pursuit of what Mr. H. M. Durand would call "a hired advocate", or "a paid agitator".

I have tried, with my very modest appliances, and in my very obscure position, to fulfil to the utmost the responsibilities thus entailed upon me. I was really beginning to think that I had done my utmost, and that my responsibilities were drawing to a close. I was on the point of telling both appellant and judge that I had made my last effort, when Mr. H. M. Durand insists on a combat *à outrance* which I had hardly contemplated, and compels publicity being given to certain details which I had intended to keep in reserve. I cannot profess to regret this compulsion, either on private or on public grounds.

Since Mr. H. M. Durand has ventured to accuse me, without subverting, or, indeed, impugning, anything that I have written, of having published "a tissue of untruths", "a string of misstatements", I have placed in the British Museum a copy of a volume called *Holkar's Appeal*, containing all the documents and *pièces justificatives* quoted in the following pages, and in the *Last Counsels of an Unknown Counsellor*. I have placed another copy in the London Library, and have distributed a few more where attention is likely to be given to them.

E. B.

* See *Last Counsels of an Unknown Counsellor* (Macmillan, 1877), p. 20.

TO

H. M. DURAND, Esq., C.S.I.,

OF THE BENGAL CIVIL SERVICE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW;

Author of *Central India in* 1857,* and of the *Life of Sir Henry Marion Durand, K.C.S.I., C.B.*†

Sir,

On the best and latest authorities I find that you hold the place of Under-Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, and that you held it in December, 1883, when you published the second work mentioned in the superscription of this letter. Those who have the best experience and opinion of your talents, will not deny that this early preferment was partly due to your father's professional and social connections. It would but be in accordance with Anglo-Indian tradition and precedent if you were to look forward to rising from the second to the highest place in that Office over which Sir Henry Durand presided for five years, and exercised considerable control for five subsequent years. That Secretaryship, you tell us, "has been, and is still, regarded as the blue riband of the Civil Service, is greatly coveted for its own sake, and is an almost certain stepping-stone to the highest posts in the Empire."‡ In the meantime you seem to have formed a sufficiently high estimate of your duties, and of the qualifications demanded for their fulfilment. At the beginning of the chapter in which you describe your father's tenure of that appointment, you observe that it

* Ridgway, Piccadilly, 1876; originally published as an article in the *Calcutta Review* for April, 1876.

† W. H. Allen, Waterloo Place, 1883.

‡ *Life of Sir Henry Durand*, vol. i, p. 282.

is "one of the most interesting and important in India. The control of our relations with the feudatory States of India, comprising one fourth of the entire continent, and containing a population of nearly sixty millions, is", as you very justly observe, "a weighty task, and requires much firmness and tact." "Such qualifications", you continue, "are rare, and they should be possessed by an Indian Foreign Secretary; for, as regards this important branch of our Indian policy, he is in fact the responsible adviser and right hand of the Viceroy." It is, indeed, as you remark, "hardly too much to say that, by the bulk of the Native Chiefs, his office is regarded as second in importance only to that of the Viceroy."*

Neither the question of your possessing the "rare qualifications" for this important office, nor that of your father having possessed them, would ever have been raised by me, had you not forced me to enter on them both by a very serious personal charge. You accuse me of having published a book which you declare to be "a tissue of untruth". The feeble style in which you deliver this poisoned and Parthian dart, in the very last paragraph of your Appendix, betrays a deficiency both in "tact" and in "firmness". The blow, as I shall prove, is a foul one and badly aimed. You say that the "attacks" upon your "father's character", on the subject of his treatment of the Maharajah Holkar, have been "shameless", "violent and acrimonious", and that "it would now be equally impossible and useless" to "avoid the controversy";† and yet you do avoid it. You did not answer my book, *Last Counsels of an Unknown Counsellor*, when it appeared, and you "do not purpose" to do so now—although its "refutation" would have been "clear and easy"—because you are "assured" it must "die a natural death". "Firmness" is decidedly wanting here.

There seems to me to be a want of "tact" in the use of offensive and provoking language without justifying its use by reason and evidence. If my book had really been a "violent and acrimonious tissue of untruth", "a

* Vol. i, pp. 280, 282. † Pp. 236, 476.

string of misstatements",* its refutation must have been to you, with all the records of Government, and all your father's papers, at your command, the most easy matter in the world. Yet you have not attempted it. There is neither "firmness" nor "tact" in calling Mr. Dickinson "a pamphleteer", or in making dark hints about "paid advocates" and "hired agitators", while you express a hope that the book, which you cannot answer, may "die a natural death". Such language is not, in any sense of the word, strong. It is at once evasive and abusive. Language is never truly strong, unless it is just. The charge, moreover, you bring against Mr. Dickinson and myself, of being "violent and acrimonious", is utterly unfounded. You are as incapable of justifying it as you are of justifying the more serious charge of "untruth" which, to adopt your language but not your tactics, I now find it "impossible to avoid". I do not intend to avoid it. Without imitating your acrimonious language, I retort that charge in substance upon you, and shall prove it up to the hilt.

The *Protest and Rejoinder* on behalf of the Maharajah Holkar, which formed the second portion of the *Last Counsels of an Unknown Counsellor*, is rightly called by you "the posthumous work of Mr. John Dickinson".† Had he lived, he would have been solely responsible for it, and my name, in all probability, would not have appeared at all. He was a wealthy and influential man, and I was his paid assistant. At his death I revised and published the book, a great part of which I had written. I then became alone responsible for what you venture to characterise as "a tissue of untruth". With my name on the title-page, and my statement that I had "for a long time been associated" with Mr. Dickinson in his work,‡ all this was obvious enough, and had been, also, made known to you by my private explanations when the book was published. Under these circumstances, I can see no "tact" in your affected aversion "to speak of Mr.

* P. 476. † *Life of Sir H. Durand*, vol. i, pp. 463, 476.

‡ *Last Counsels of an Unknown Counsellor* (Macmillan & Co., 1877), p. 59.

Dickinson in the tone which he", according to your complaint, "adopted towards your father and yourself",* while you insult him by impeaching his veracity. You make no attempt to justify that impeachment, because "Mr. Dickinson is dead", and because you are "assured" his posthumous work will "certainly die a natural death". I can see no "firmness" in this manœuvre to the rear. Your assurance was very ill-founded. The book is intact, and Mr. Dickinson's representative is alive.

You should have remembered that the book in question was a rejoinder to the pamphlets published by General Travers and yourself. You might have remarked a peculiar difference in the style with which I treated his pamphlet and yours. Notwithstanding his bitter prejudice against Holkar, blindly accepted from his personal friend, Colonel Durand, in General Travers I always recognised a chivalrous and gallant soldier, and a perfectly trustworthy informant as to matters that had fallen under his own observation. He is one of my most important witnesses, the more valuable because reluctant and hostile.

But I charged you with misstatements and exaggerations which could not easily be explained or excused even with the most liberal allowance for filial respect and affection. Your method of meeting this charge is peculiar. You will not answer my book, but you admit that you "have been accused of exaggerating".† You then maintain and repeat the exaggerations of your pamphlet in more vague and general terms, omitting the salient points that had made my exposure of your inaccuracy so effective and so conspicuous. For example, in the large volume you no longer say that your father "*saw* the whole of Holkar's troops surging up to surround the Residency".‡ Still, as they stand at present, the exaggerations, direct or suggested, are sufficiently remarkable in your later publication.

"The attack," you say, "was no longer a tentative one. Encouraged by the impunity with which the guns had

* Vol. i, p. 476. † P. 467. ‡ *Central India in* 1857, p. 55.

for nearly two hours cannonaded the Residency, Holkar's troops in the City came pouring up to their support."*

And then you go on to say that Holkar had "nine good English guns, 1,400 Cavalry and about 2,000 Infantry", and that "the lines were rapidly emptied"—just as if all these troops had appeared on the scene, or had made a threatening demonstration. Refusing to answer or notice my "violent and acrimonious" book, in the hope that it may "die a natural death", you remain obstinately silent as to the conclusive evidence therein adduced that no such demonstration was made. Dr. Charles Thomson, in medical charge, who was present during the attack, and accompanied Colonel Durand's retreat, in the written statement he made on the 22nd of January, 1858, says:—

"After having retired a very short distance from the Residency, the mutineers did not molest us, *and during the whole of the mutiny I never saw any of the mutineers.*"†

A fortiori, he never saw "Holkar's troops pouring up", "Cavalry, Infantry, and Artillery pouring up in a mass", "the whole of Holkar's troops surging up", "surging up to surround the Residency, masses of Holkar's troops, consisting of 1,400 Cavalry, 2,000 Infantry, and 25 to 30 guns, besides any amount of armed rabble from the city."‡

The unimpeachable evidence of your father's friend, General Travers, which I shall quote in a passage from your own book, proves likewise that neither he nor your father saw, or fancied they saw, any additional force of Holkar's troops from the City arriving to join in the attack on the Residency. This is what you say:—

"The overwhelming strength of the enemy's force on this occasion has never, I think, been fully realised. General Travers in his pamphlet speaks of the 'overwhelming numbers' against us; but he further describes the force as follows:—'Three field guns, one more or less damaged, nine or ten companies of Infantry,

* Vol. i, p. 215.

† Letter from Governor-General's Agent to Secretary in Foreign Department (General No. 309A), No. 47, 9th February, 1858; *Last Counsels*, p. 99.

‡ *Central India in* 1857, pp. 53, 54, 55.

and an increasing armed crowd from the City.' Similarly, Colonel Malleson writes of "six hundred trained Sepoys, swelled by the constantly augmenting rabble of the City."*

But where are the "nine good English guns, the 1,400 Cavalry, and the 2,000 Infantry", "surging up"? You do not give us the explanatory statement of Colonel Malleson, from the personal information of General Travers, that the force of "six hundred trained Sepoys" consisted of "about two hundred of all ranks of Holkar's men, and the Contingent Infantry"—our own Sepoys—"who just about this time fairly went over to the rebels."† There is nothing here as to "Holkar's troops from the City pouring up to their support".

Neither in his original military despatch, enclosed in Colonel Durand's letter to Government, dated Hoshungabad, 9th of July, 1857, nor in the equally modest and candid narrative of his exploit published in 1876, does General Travers speak of any assailants or opponents except the "Regular Infantry" and "three guns", "sent by the Maharajah Holkar for the protection of the Residency", and "an armed crowd from the direction of 'the City'." He never said one word as to any hostile Cavalry, additional guns, or troops of any description arriving or looming in the distance.

In describing the first incidents of the attack, you say that the guns "were supported by Holkar's Cavalry".‡ This is an utterly unfounded and unwarrantable misstatement, contradicted by the military despatch of Major Travers, as well as by the gallant General's published narrative of 1876. There is nothing to show that even as many as a dozen rebel horsemen were seen by anyone in addition to the "eight troopers" who, according to General Travers,§ accompanied Saadut Khan, and who doubtless were cowed by the dashing

* Vol. i, Appendix, pp. 466, 467.

† *Malleson's History of the Indian Mutiny*, vol. i (Allen, 1878), footnote to p. 224. See also General Travers' *Evacuation of Indore* (H. S. King & Co., 1876), pp. 9 and 56.

‡ P. 214.

§ *Evacuation of Indore*, p. 12.

charge of the English Commandant, in which their leader was wounded.

You say, quite correctly, that "the force from the Residency retired at a walk".*

The party consisted of seventeen English persons, besides eight women and two children. General Travers says, "Our draught bullocks could not be forced beyond a rate of two and a half to three miles an hour."† If even a hundred horsemen—to say nothing of "masses" or "swarms pouring up"—had intervened or pursued, the whole party must have been massacred.

The gross and palpable exaggerations of your pamphlet, unretracted, but reproduced in a more shadowy form, in your large book, are not only unsupported but absolutely contradicted by the recorded statements of General Travers and of Sir Henry Durand. For example, Colonel Durand, writing to Lord Lovaine on September the 29th, 1857, speaks of "the humiliation of being forced to withdraw before an enemy that I despised, *and who, could I have got anything to fight, would have been easily beaten back.* As it was, with only fourteen Golundauz who would stand by their guns, we not only held our own for about a couple of hours, but beat back their guns, and gained temporary advantage. We retired unmolested in the face of superior masses."‡ Can anyone believe that Holkar's troops, "Cavalry, Infantry, and Artillery in a mass, with additional guns", "swarming", "surging", and "pouring up", could have been "easily beaten back" by Colonel Durand and his "fourteen Golundauz", or if he had seen them, would have been "despised"? Observe particularly that Colonel Durand says he was "*forced to withdraw* before" the "enemy he despised", not before "masses", whom he could not have despised, "swarming", "surging" or "pouring up". The "masses", the "swarms", the "Cavalry cutting off the retreat", existed only in the treacherous voices of our Mahidpore and Bhopal Sepoys, with whom the hasty and

* P. 471. † *Evacuation of Indore*, p. 16.

‡ Kaye's *Sepoy War*, vol. iii, pp. 332, 333; *Last Counsels*, p. 105.

half-pretended attack of Holkar's detachment was concerted.

The exaggerations in which you persist compel me to call attention to the true nature and proportions of the attack on the Indore Residency. You speak of the imaginary mass of Holkar's troops "pouring up from the City", having been "encouraged by the impunity with which the guns had for nearly two hours cannonaded the Residency."* More remarkable than "the impunity" of the cannonade was its ineffectiveness. Here is your own description of the Residency. It "was a stone building, standing in an open space, and pierced in the lower story by some five-and-twenty or thirty glass and venetian doors, incapable", according to Colonel Malleson, "of resisting even a kick."† "Holkar's guns", you say in another place, "had now moved round to their original position, where they had more shelter, and were pouring a well-directed fire of round shot and grape into the Residency building itself. This did little harm, beyond breaking a few panes of glass."‡

In this cannonade of two hours—"well directed," you say, for some time—a few panes of glass were broken, and only one of the English defenders, Sergeant Murphy, was wounded. "In the fight itself", you say, "our loss had not been heavy. A few Bhopal Contingent horsemen, a few Bheels and some bullocks were killed; and one of the European sergeants was wounded. These were the only casualties."§

The affair of the Indore Residency was, with the exception of the daring charge of Major Travers, entirely an artillery duel, in which all the skill, and probably all the real fighting, was on our side, and in which our side had the best of it; for while only one of the men with our guns was wounded, we disabled one of the enemy's guns, which is not likely to have occurred without some of the enemy being killed. It is not easy to understand how so many cannon-balls could fly about harmlessly; and you may be right in saying that "a few Bhopal horsemen, a

* P. 215. † P. 466, footnote. ‡ P. 215. § P. 216.

few Bheels and some bullocks were killed". But there is much reason to believe that the assailants had no wish to hurt any of our Sepoys, with whom the outbreak was concerted. Colonel Durand, in his despatch of 13th August, 1857, says :—" There cannot be the slightest doubt that the attack on the Residency was concerted with the Bhopal and Malwa Contingents, and with the conspiracy of the Mhow troops."

It was in the fact that Major Travers did not know what he was charging that the gallantry of the deed which won him the Victoria Cross consisted. For all he knew, he was leading five troopers against three guns supported by a compact body of Infantry. He was really attacking a half hearted and bewildered body of mutineers, without a leader, without any object except that of plundering the Residency, and without any intention of coming to blows with their treacherous accomplices. Major Travers could only rally five of his men to follow him for five minutes. It was treachery, not physical cowardice, that kept his men back. The General himself, with that touching reluctance to abandon faith in his own men that was admirably but fatally conspicuous in so many instances during the mutinies, talked to the last of their " loyalty", and of distrust and panic among them. But there was no panic : there was, as you say, treason in their ranks. General Travers, in a passage which you quote,* states that when he tried to form the picket for his charge on the guns, the formation was three times broken from the rear by a native officer, who was afterwards hung for his misconduct.† It was, also, proved at the trial of Saadut Khan in 1874 that the rebel leader was accompanied at his parade on the 2nd of July, 1857, by several troopers of Major Travers' regiment.

The sole excuse for the false notions as to the origin and basis of the outbreak under which Colonel Durand left the Residency, and made his first reports to Bombay and to Calcutta, is to be found in the lies that were told to Major Travers by his treacherous troopers, with the

* P. 213.

† *Evacuation of Indore*, p. 13.

obvious intention of hastening the evacuation of the Residency, and leaving it clear for plunder. "On the field at Indore", says General Travers, "one of my Sepoys (Gunesh Singh, I think), told me that the Maharajah had ordered the attack",—that "most of the Sepoys had heard the order given, and that it had turned many against us."* This was a malignant lie, but it led Colonel Durand at once to commit himself in his notes to the Commandant of Mhow, and in his early correspondence with Lord Elphinstone and Lord Canning, to the assertion that they were "attacked by Holkar" "with true Mahratta treachery".

Major Travers, again, in paragraph 5 of his military despatch, enclosed in Colonel Durand's letter from Hoshungabad of the 9th of July, 1857, says:—"I was led to believe by reports from my Cavalry that our left flank would be immediately assailed by troops from the City, who were said to be working round into our rear." This, likewise, was a lie, but you produce one of the exaggerated effects in your original pamphlet by introducing the recreant trooper's false report as if it represented a real incident. "Some of Holkar's guns and Cavalry", you said, "were moving round to cut off the retreat."† In the text of your large book you only say, as authorised by Major Travers, "Some of Holkar's guns and Cavalry were *said* to be moving round to cut off the retreat."‡ But in your Appendix, avowedly controversial with regard to Sir John Kaye—though you leave my book to "die a natural death"—you reproduce the trooper's lie. "After Holkar's troops had begun to cut off the retreat, there was no time left to wait."§ But it is quite untrue that anyone had begun to cut off the retreat. The line of retreat on Mhow was quite open, and there was no pursuit, or menace of pursuit.

"The slow and orderly retreat from the Residency", you complain, "was denominated a 'flight'."|| It was just its "slow and orderly character" that made it a

* *Evacuation of Indore*, p. 12, footnote.
† *Central India in* 1857, p. 24.
‡ P. 215. § P. 466. || P. 226.

"flight", and showed that "the post", *i.e.*, the post of Governor-General's Agent, which could have been held, and was held so advantageously by Hungerford and Hutchinson at Mhow, "had been needlessly abandoned."

It has already been shown that neither General Travers, in his official despatch and his pamphlet of 1876, nor Sir Henry Durand, in any public or private letter, ever stated that they *saw*, or that anybody *saw*, any additional force of Holkar's troops proceeding from the City to join in the attack on the Residency. But there is a paragraph in Colonel Durand's despatch from Mhow of August 18th, 1857, which, giving you very large license on account of filial regard and respect, does in some degree extenuate the exaggerations of your pamphlet and of your large volume. It is as follows:—

> "4. Considering the deliberate arrangements made by Holkar's Cavalry for cutting off European fugitives, even before a shot was fired, it was strange that the Durbar should have failed in receiving early intimation that some unusual movement was taking place. When the treacherous attack of Holkar's guns and troops which were at the Residency, was supported by additional guns and troops hurrying to the scene of action from their lines, and no word or message came from the Maharajah, there certainly was every appearance that the troops acting so unanimously must be advancing by order of the Durbar. This conclusion was natural, and at once pervaded the few troops that were loyal to the British officers that commanded them."

This paragraph really contains nothing but a reproduction of the lies devised by our mutinous Sepoys—"the few troops that were loyal"—to clear out the Residency for plunder. Major Travers, in his despatch, mentions the same "natural conclusion" on the part of his men, but obviously as a false, or at least a doubtful report, which he could neither verify by his own observation, nor confirm by authentic intelligence. Colonel Durand, having committed himself to denunciations of Holkar, based on the Sepoys' lies, from that day forward allowed the "natural conclusion" of our "loyal" troops to harden by frequent repetition into a positive statement. The statement was utterly unauthenticated, and was not

merely unconfirmed, but contradicted, by all subsequent inquiries; but it suited Colonel Durand's apologetic purposes, and held its place accordingly in his irresponsible talk and in his private correspondence.

Here is another absolute, though vague, misstatement by Colonel Durand, in a matter most essential to Holkar's justification, which you cannot but know to be a misstatement, and to have been exposed in the *Last Counsels*, and which you, nevertheless, reproduce in its vaguest form, as if it were a true statement, left quite intact by your "violent and acrimonious" opponents.

On the 18th of August, 1857, a fortnight after Colonel Durand's return to Mhow, he wrote a despatch to Government which in one place you cite as "far from unfavourable"* to the Maharajah, and in another as written "in Holkar's favour."† Yet in this despatch, as you know, the best that Colonel Durand can say of the Maharajah, is that "*he may have been as ignorant of what was plotting, and as much surprised and intimidated when the attack took place*, as he represents." Everyone but yourself will, I am sure, appreciate the odious use here of the word *intimidated*. But, you say, Colonel Durand observed that "a marked distinction was to be drawn between the Maharajah and his Durbar".‡ Exactly—that is the absolute though vague misstatement by Colonel Durand that I now have in hand,—a misstatement adopted by the Calcutta Foreign Office, though contradicted by explicit details on record, and repeatedly placed before the Viceroys by your predecessors, as you now place them before the public, as genuine materials for a decision. These are the words of the despatch:—

"Whatever may be thought of the conduct of those who surrounded his person, many of whom must have known what was plotting, and some of whom were actual participators and leaders, as Saadut Khan, there can be no doubt of his Highness's anxiety to separate his own name and fame from the guilt of participation in an attack marked by equal treachery and atrocity."

Of course, if Holkar had been guilty, this anxiety

* P. 221. † P. 469. ‡ P. 221.

would have been equally manifest, so that there is nothing said in his Highness's favour so far. He goes on :—

"I have drawn a marked distinction between the Maharajah and his Durbar. Personally, he may have been as ignorant of what was plotting, and as much surprised and intimidated when the attack took place, as he represents, but this was not possible as to the members of the Durbar. Some of these were leaders in the insurrection, and many more must have been cognisant of the intrigues and tampering with the troops that was going on."

The "marked distinction" which Colonel Durand most unwarrantably drew between the Maharajah and his Durbar, was not really "favourable" to his Highness, as you try to make out,* but most injurious to him. Nothing could be more insidiously hostile. Anyone of ordinary common sense would say that if the Prince's daily associates and advisers had been conspiring against the British Government, in concert with our mutinous troops, he could hardly have been ignorant of what was going on. Colonel Durand, positively denouncing the Durbar, only suggests that Holkar "*may* have been ignorant". The insinuation is most unfavourable, under colour of moderation and fairness, while the denunciation of the Durbar is entirely devoid of truth.

In this letter of the 18th August, 1857, written at Mhow, while the local inquiries on which a report could be founded were in progress, Colonel Durand describes Saadut Khan as "*in his Highness's Court and about his person*", and declares that some "*members of the Durbar*" "*were leaders in the insurrection*"; the only leader whom he names being that same Saadut Khan, who was not in the Durbar, was not "in his Highness's Court and about his person", but was out of employ, and in disgrace.

The Viceregal Government eventually treated this denunciation of the Indore Durbar as if it had been, as it was, a rash and hasty denunciation, quite devoid of truth, for in reply to Sir Robert Hamilton's report, dated April 26th, 1858, founded on the local inquiries instituted, but not used, by Colonel Durand, *all* the members of the

* Pp. 221, 469.

Durbar, with five other officers of rank at Holkar's Court, received "the cordial thanks" of the Governor-General for their "excellent services", "loyalty", and "assistance" given to the British Government.*

The only person that Colonel Durand names as being an "actual participator and leader in the insurrection", is Saadut Khan. Saadut Khan, as you know very well, was not a member of the Durbar, and was not attached to the Maharajah's person. In your original pamphlet, *Central India in* 1857, to which the *Last Counsels* was expressly a rejoinder, you said of the insurgents, "A Durbar officer of high rank called them out to the attack," and in another passage, "One of the leaders of the insurgents was a Durbar officer named Saadut Khan, who was hanged two years ago for his share in that day's work."†

You must know now, if you did not know then, both from the details given in my book, which you leave unanswered in the hope it may "die a natural death", and from the records in your own Office, exactly what the position of Saadut Khan was. He was not an officer "of high rank". He was a Rissaldar without a Rissala,—drawing pay but having no command. He was, also, Deputy Collector of Customs, but under suspension. He was "a Durbar officer" in the same way that Captain A. is "a Queen's officer", and in no other way,—in the service of Government, but not in the Prince's household or counsels. He was a discredited person, employed in a subordinate place under Captain Fenwick, an East Indian in Holkar's service. He was a man with a grievance; and his grievance was the refusal of the Maharajah to recognise him as a member of the Durbar, as entitled to hereditary rank and emolument. When he actually became a ringleader in the conspiracy and outbreak he was a disgraced and discontented man,—disgraced by the Durbar, and discontented with the position the Durbar had assigned to him.

You do not, however, admit or notice the error

* Appendix A, The Durbar.

† *Central India in* 1857, pp. 24 and 52.

exposed by me. You content yourself with dropping the name of Saadut Khan altogether out of your book. You say nothing now about the special "officer of high rank", but employ a general insinuation that "some of his" (Holkar's) "officers were prominent among the insurgents."* None of the Maharajah's officers, except the two or three belonging to the detachment, were "prominent" or present in the outbreak. Besides the substitution of this misleading generality for the name of Saadut Khan, "an officer of high rank", you adhere to "the broad distinction to be drawn between Holkar and his Durbar."† And this "distinction" you profess to consider as "far from unfavourable" to his Highness, and as having been written "in Holkar's favour".† It was at any rate the very best thing that Colonel Durand could ever bring himself to write regarding Holkar's conduct.

Let us now see what is the very worst that, according to your newest and latest version, he ever alleged against Holkar.

Before entering on that part of my subject, I must say that in my humble judgment the "tact" of an Under-Secretary in the Indian Foreign Office who takes upon himself to malign publicly one of the most influential of Indian Princes, appears rather open to doubt. I will add, and I shall prove, that your "tact", in the private capacity of apologist for Sir Henry Durand, is very much at fault, when you bring prominently forward those dark insinuations against Holkar which your father, to all appearance, was desirous of keeping in the background. I have long searched in vain for the very worst accusation or imputation that Colonel Durand could bring against the Maharajah. I have dragged it out of you at last, and it is just what I expected,—an impalpable slander, without even an ostensible foundation. This is the very worst that you, Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office, in possession of your father's papers, and with access to all the records of the Government of India, can say against the Maharajah Holkar :—

* P. 220. † Pp. 221 and 469.

"So far as I have been able to make out from the several references to this subject scattered throughout his letters, he (Sir Henry Durand) did not consider that Holkar had actually gone against us or instigated his troops to rise. But he gradually came to the conclusion that Holkar had been trimming, and trying to stand fair with both sides, and that he had known a good deal more than he had told. 'Holkar's waiting game,' he wrote to Lord Ellenborough, 'was spoilt by the leaders of the Indore insurrection hurrying his troops and people into untimely action. He felt that their precipitation had hopelessly ruined him unless he could patch up matters with us.'"*

Here I find the strongest and most complete confirmation of all that I have written as to Sir Henry Durand's treatment of Holkar. You can only "make out" what your father's professed views in this matter were from "scattered references" in his private correspondence. In no document, public or private, in none of Sir Henry Durand's despatches, minutes, or familiar letters, can you find—any more than Sir John Kaye could—anything definite or intelligible against Holkar, or anything to verify the vague imputations and scornful calumny with which the Maharajah was continuously and confidentially persecuted by Sir Henry Durand for more than eleven years.

Let us, however, take the general purport of the "scattered references". Sir Henry Durand, having originally denounced Holkar as his treacherous assailant, "gradually came to the conclusion that Holkar had been trimming, and trying to stand fair with both sides". With "both sides"! What is meant by this? The British Government was on one side, but who was on the other in June and July, 1857? The Sepoy mutineers, and more particularly and immediately the mutineers of the Mhow brigade. The Maharajah Holkar was a highly intelligent and well-educated Prince, who had visited some of the great centres of British power in India, had made the personal acquaintance of Lord Elphinstone at Bombay, and was on terms of the closest and most cordial affection with Sir Robert Hamilton, whose children he was accustomed to call his brothers and sisters.

* P. 236.

I can anticipate the sneers with which you will greet this mention of the distinguished gentleman who carried the infant Prince in his arms to the Musnud, was virtually guardian and regent during the minority, and occupied the place of Governor-General's Agent at Indore for the long period of fourteen years. During the eight months of Sir Robert Hamilton's absence, from April to December 1857, Colonel Durand, who was acting for him, managed to blast the reputation and to blight the life of Holkar, and to produce a dilemma for himself very much like what you say Sir John Kaye propounded, viz :—" that the justification of Holkar implied" your " father's condemnation,"*—that unless Holkar was a traitor, Colonel Durand was " a bad political officer".

Sir Robert Hamilton, although the natural protector of Holkar, did not, on resuming his charge in December 1857, so much espouse the Maharajah's cause as place before Government the simple facts regarding the outbreak at Indore collected but neglected by Colonel Durand. Before leaving Indore, Sir Robert Hamilton had been authorised to read, and had read in Durbar, to Holkar, a letter from the Viceroy, Lord Canning, dated " Calcutta, 26th March 1859", announcing that his Highness was to receive a territorial reward " in due proportion" to the " Nizam and Scindia".† Until this promise, made by him as the Viceroy's representative and in the Viceroy's own words, was redeemed, Sir Robert Hamilton felt that the honour of our Government was compromised, and that his own honour was pledged to make every effort to ensure the fulfilment of that promise. You not only upbraid Sir Robert Hamilton without any apparent grounds, as " unfriendly" and " hostile" to your father, but make offensive incursions into the regions of private life, which, although they may suit your notions of " tact and firmness", appear to me hardly consistent with good manners and fair dealing. The rather ill-natured gossip about Sir Robert Hamilton's large establishment of horses, carriages, and servants, and the

* P. 475. † Appendix B.

marriages of his daughters, which you have extracted from Colonel Durand's private letters,* was assuredly never meant, even by him, for publication. It has no bearing whatever on the subject, except so far as it confirms a very general belief in Sir Henry Durand's habit of treating anyone who stood in his way as a personal foe and a noxious creature, and of privately denouncing him all round.

Unfortunately for Holkar, facilities for private denunciation were afforded to Colonel Durand at a very early moment, and remained constantly open to him for eleven years. Very soon after Sir Robert Hamilton had resumed charge of the Residency at Indore, on the 15th of December 1857, Colonel Durand was called "on special duty", to Lord Canning's side. From that day his private reports of what he had not seen, and of the operations in which he had not taken part, and of the Prince whom he had seen twice in three months, prevailed against the public and official statements made by the officers at Mhow who had succeeded in the work which Colonel Durand had abandoned as impracticable, and by Sir Robert Hamilton, who had been for thirteen years at Indore.

I do not hesitate to say that if he even for a time suspected Holkar, as you say he did, of "trimming with both sides", and of "playing a waiting game", that suspicion is enough to stamp Colonel Durand as "a bad political officer". It was not merely that, as Sir John Kaye justly said, he wanted "tolerance", lacked "imagination", and "could not Orientalise himself". He could not understand or appreciate, though the problem was easy enough, the personalities with which he had to deal. Holkar was, as I have said, and as no one disputes, an intelligent and well-educated Prince. He was surrounded by enlightened and English-speaking councillors, and was absolutely without any turbulent or fanatical connections. The best possible excuse for Colonel Durand having made the utterly unfounded report that "*some of those who surrounded the Maharajah's person*", and

* P. 198.

"*some of the Dúrbar*", were "*actual participators and leaders in the attack*", would be that in the three months he had passed at Indore he had, as you say, "only seen Holkar twice",* that he did not care to know who were in the Prince's confidence and intimacy, or how the Durbar was constituted. This, I say, is the best and most charitable excuse for Colonel Durand's gross misstatement regarding the Indore Durbar, but then it fixes upon him indelibly the stain you are trying to efface. The Agent who, at such a crisis, could hold aloof, in a supercilious and unsympathetic attitude, from the Prince and the Court that formed the very centre and heart of his charge, was essentially, root and branch, "a bad political officer".

You deny that your father had "an antipathy" to Holkar. You claim to have "shown" that he "wrote in Holkar's favour to Lord Canning", and that "nothing can be less inimical or indicative of the antipathy which Kaye most unjustly attributes to him than the tone of these letters".† The tone of those letters, as I have just proved, was as thoroughly inimical as their tenor was inaccurate. Not a word can be found in them that is really written "in Holkar's favour". But before coming to the "inimical" stage,—for you state that Colonel Durand "gradually" lost faith in "the Maharajah's loyalty", and that "as time went on his doubts were strengthened",‡—it is necessary to make some remarks on the Agent's intercourse with Holkar before the insurrection. You bring forward as evidence that there could be no "antipathy", the fact that Colonel Durand "had been three months at Indore, and had only seen Holkar twice". You do not perceive the true significance of that fact as evincing Colonel Durand's contempt for information and advice from Native sources, and his disregard for close and friendly relations with the Court of Indore and its notabilities. In three months Colonel Durand saw Holkar twice; one of these visits being his formal pre-

* P. 474, and *Central India*, p. 69.

† P. 469.

‡ Pp. 235, 236, 469.

sentation on arrival, the other having been solicited by the Maharajah ; and he never invited his Highness to visit the Residency.

On the 9th of June 1857, three weeks before the outbreak, at a conference which he specially called at the palace, Holkar warned Colonel Durand that, in the event of a mutiny at Mhow, his own troops could not be trusted, and gave the wisest advice for the emergency, that the treasure—about £130,000 in specie and £240,000 in Government paper—should not be left, as a temptation to attack, in the Residency, but should be sent off at once to the military cantonment of Mhow. The Maharajah also urged that the English ladies should immediately go to the same place, and that the Residency buildings should be made into a strong military post. Colonel Durand would not take this advice. He said that European troops were shortly expected, and that the precautions recommended would only cause alarm and tend to encourage the evil-disposed. Alarm could not be prevented. From the 9th of June to the 1st of July not only alarm was felt but frequent warnings were given to Colonel Durand. With every well-informed person expecting an outbreak, no preparations were made to meet it. He even rejected the military advice of two Engineer officers, Captains Ludlow and Cobbe—coincident and identical with that of the Maharajah—that the Residency should be entrenched, and that the treasure should be moved from a detached building into the Residency, so that there should be only one place to defend. The Uncovenanted servants complained afterwards that, although their numbers were considerable, they were not embodied or organised, and had no place of security selected into which they could retire.* The contemptible nature of the attack, when the outbreak occurred, and the ease with which a slow retirement was effected, are enough to suggest very strongly that if due preparations had been made, the results of the mutiny at Indore on the 1st

* Sir R. Hamilton's despatch, No. 47, of the 9th February 1858, to the Government of India.

of July 1857, might have been very different from what they were.

When we take into consideration these timely but neglected counsels, the good faith of which it is impossible to doubt, and those points as to the talents, training, and associations of Holkar and his councillors, with which Colonel Durand ought to have been familiar, his hasty suspicion and condemnation of the Maharajah and of his Durbar, are enough to convict him of being "a bad political officer". When Colonel Durand avoided the cantonment of Mhow, because he thought it would be attacked by Holkar, when he wrote to Lord Elphinstone that "Holkar's treachery was of the true Mahratta stamp",* he showed himself to be a "bad political officer".

Your contention, however, is that although, "to begin with", Colonel Durand "certainly imagined that Holkar had thrown in his lot against us", "directly Holkar disclaimed such intention, he accepted and favourably noticed the Maharajah's explanations." With the "favourable notice" I have already dealt. Then came an unfavourable stage. "He was not entirely convinced of the Maharajah's loyalty; and as time went on his doubts became strengthened."† And in another part of your book you say that your father "lost his former confidence in Holkar, and left Indore under the impression that justice would not be done". At first he had, you say, been inclined to consider him" (Holkar) "sincere in disclaiming participation with the mutineers. Nevertheless, he had felt some doubts on the subject, and they had been confirmed by one or two circumstances which occurred during the rainy season, by conversation with various natives of the country, and by the additional information which he had acquired regarding events at Indore before and during the rising."‡

This is a very remarkable passage. Although you are a barrister-at-law, and have been, I presume, a magistrate, you seem not only to be quite ignorant as to what

* Kaye's *Sepoy War*, vol. iii, p. 347.

† P. 469. ‡ Pp. 235, 236.

constitutes evidence, but not to comprehend the enormity of the charge that you are making here, in your father's name, against the Maharajah Holkar. In your Appendix you say that Colonel Durand's "doubts" amounted to nothing more than this, that at the "beginning of the outbreak Holkar was playing a waiting game". And there is nothing, you urge, very dreadful in this, "considering that Sir John Kaye expresses the same doubt regarding all the Native Chiefs in India."* In the passage just quoted from the text you say that when your father left Indore he no longer considered "Holkar sincere in disclaiming participation with the mutineers", his "doubts on the subject" having "been confirmed by one or two circumstances which occurred during the rainy season, by conversation with various natives, and by additional information which he had acquired".†

Will you be so good as to tell us whether this "additional information" was communicated to the Government of India? I can find no trace or hint of it in the official proceedings.

You have now informed us that Colonel Durand, who, to begin with, inaccurately denounced "members of the Durbar" as "participators and leaders in the outbreak", and made a favourable distinction between the Maharajah and his Durbar, believed at last, likewise, in Holkar's personal "participation with the mutineers". Thus he, according to you, dropped the "marked distinction" he had made in Holkar's favour.

You endeavour, moreover, to show some cause for this change. Colonel Durand's doubts were "confirmed", you say, "by one or two circumstances", one of which you give, as follows, in a footnote :—"For example, by finding that while professing the utmost fear of their troops, the Durbar were importing a large quantity of pig-lead for musket ammunition. The lead was seized and lodged in Mhow fort."‡

You have, throughout your narrative, adopted the highly coloured and exaggerated pictures drawn by

* Pp. 469, 470. † Pp. 235, 236. ‡ Footnote, p. 235.

Colonel Durand, when he found out his mistake in having avoided Mhow, as to the unanimous misconduct of Holkar's troops. You have even improved upon them, with some little excuse from your father's loose diction, by presenting the troopers' lies about the retreat being cut off, and more guns and Cavalry approaching, as if they represented actual events that Colonel Durand had seen with his own eyes.* In the same way you grossly exaggerate Holkar's temporary loss of authority and influence during the wild excitement caused by the evacuation of the Residency. You make the most unwarrantable assertion that "Holkar was entirely powerless. He neither had nor pretended to have the smallest remnant of control when his troops rose". "He could not",† you continue, "punish or keep under restraint the leader of the attack, who came to him in his Palace, and boasted of having wounded a sahib".‡ He did restrain Saadut Khan for several hours, and that miscreant was in confinement when the Residency was evacuated, so that the mutineers were without a leader at the critical moment when Colonel Durand's little band was without defence. The consequence was that the English party was able to retire, "unmolested", "at the rate of two-and-a-half miles an hour".

You base your wild assertions as to Holkar's whole army "surging up", on an alleged statement by the Durbar Vakeel to Colonel Durand, that "the lines were empty".§ These words convey no information unless we know to what hour in the day they refer. Even in your father's own account of his conversation with Ganesh Shastri, which you vainly imagine to "set the point at rest", there is not one word to show that "the lines were empty" before Colonel Durand had retired.‖ That the Durbar Vakeel, Ganesh Shastri, who is still, I believe, living, ever said that the "lines were empty" during the attack or the retirement "at the rate of two-and-a-half miles an hour", is utterly untrue, and will not bear a minute's reflection. If any such movement of

* *Ante*, p. 4; *Central India in* 1857, pp. 53, 55. † P. 464.
‡ *Ibid.* § Pp. 215, 467. ‖ P. 467.

Holkar's troops had taken place—nay, if a hundred horsemen had assailed them—the fugitives must have perished. It is quite true that an utter overthrow of discipline followed the news of the British officers having retired. The greed of plunder led nearly all the troops to visit the Residency in the course of the day; but some of the Durbar troops behaved very well from first to last; a certain number were accounted for as on guard at the Palace and other posts; some, including the Maharajah's Household Cavalry, obeyed the orders to remain in their quarters.

You must know—or you ought to know, with the best information at hand—that even if Holkar's troops had all behaved badly, the greater part soon returned to their allegiance and their duty. Within three days after Holkar was relieved from the pressure of our Sepoy mutineers, three columns of his troops were sent out for the rescue of British officers. And not only were several detachments of Holkar's troops constantly employed, to the end of the war, in keeping the country quiet and suppressing marauders, but they served under British officers in some of the most decisive actions against the rebels in the neighbourhood, on which occasions the Maharajah and his commanders were thanked by the Bombay and Supreme Governments.

If, then, some of the Maharajah Holkar's troops, after the terrible excitement caused by the mutiny of British troops and the flight of British officers had cooled down a little, were doing good and faithful service, it was right, I suppose, that they should be supplied with the ordinary munitions of war. I have no doubt as to the fact that Colonel Durand seized some "pig-lead", and lodged it in Mhow Fort. That at such a time he should have ostentatiously proclaimed, by many offensive and insulting words and acts, his dislike of the Maharajah Holkar, proves that he was "a bad political officer". But the circumstance you consider so important has no other significance.

You have yet another explanation of Colonel Durand's gradual belief in Holkar's "participation with the muti-

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neers". Referring to your father's opinion as to "Holkar's waiting game", you say, "His opinion was greatly strengthened by finding that Lord Elphinstone, who had at first written strongly in favour of Holkar, was afterwards inclined to take the same view, and this upon information gained independently in the Bombay Presidency."

This is what Lord Elphinstone wrote to the Viceroy, Lord Canning :—

"Colonel Durand appears to be under the impression that Holkar had turned against us, and that he was attacked by his orders. This, however, is certainly not the case. On the same evening Holkar wrote to Colonel Durand and to me, protesting his innocence, and entreating that the march of General Woodburn's force should be hastened as much as possible."*

This is what he wrote to Colonel Durand :—

"If he (Holkar) had been ill-disposed towards us, the whole country would have risen. All the smaller Chiefs seem to have taken their cue from him ; and even to the borders of Gujerat, the effects of his conduct would have been apparent. This comes to me from too many sources to admit of any doubt. Let me, therefore, beg you not to harbour any prejudices against Holkar, to whom I cannot but think we are very much indebted for the preservation of the peace in Malwa and also in Gujerat."†

You object, however, to Sir John Kaye's assertion that Lord Elphinstone, "*with all the facts before him*", pronounced in favour of Holkar's loyalty and condemned Colonel Durand's "prejudice". What, according to you, "appears from the letters quoted by Sir John Kaye", is "that very shortly after the outbreak, when Lord Elphinstone had *not* all the facts before him, he wrote to my father and others asserting Holkar's innocence".‡ I will not trouble you now to answer my big book,—let us consider that it has "died a natural death",—but should you decide on making an example of this little pamphlet and its author, perhaps you will tell us what "*all the facts*" are, and what in particular are the facts which were *not*

* Kaye's *Sepoy War*, vol. iii, p. 349.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 349, 350.

‡ P. 474.

before Lord Elphinstone, when he rebuked Colonel Durand and recommended Holkar to the Viceroy's protection against that official's prejudice. You have given us your one little "circumstance" of the "pig-lead". But what are "*all the facts*"? We have under Lord Elphinstone's hand his detection and rebuke of Colonel Durand's "prejudices" against Holkar; his declaration of Holkar's good influence over "the smaller Chiefs" of Western India, "even to the borders of Gujerat"; his assurance that Holkar's valuable services in time of need "will not be forgotten by the British Government".

I think, under the circumstances, impartial readers will prefer this written testimony—consistent with all officially recorded facts—to your vague, inexplicit, and unauthenticated statements as to "personal assurances", and as to Colonel Durand "finding" that Lord Elphinstone was "afterwards inclined"* to alter his views. I cannot see that you have acquired any right or title by the scrupulous candour and accuracy of your method, to have your "scattered references" accepted without verification in preference to testimony for which I give chapter and verse.

I regret to observe that you still persist, notwithstanding my very full exposure of your error, in the presumptuous impertinence of censuring Major Hungerford, who assumed the duties of Agent to the Governor-General when Colonel Durand left the precincts of his charge. You endeavour to stigmatise Major Hungerford, whose conduct was approved and warmly commended by the Viceroy, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Commandant of Artillery, as having not been "strong before the outbreak", as having not been "ready during the outbreak", and as having been "injudicious after the outbreak". You attempt to ridicule this gallant officer, who died in 1858, as "*the Artilleryman, who, unable to stir out of Mhow, and ignorant of Holkar's conduct before the rising, established himself as representative of the Governor-General*",—for which, be it observed, he received Lord

* P. 474.

Canning's thanks,—and you take upon yourself to censure Lieutenant (now Colonel) Hutchinson as "*an equally ignorant Political Assistant, who was a fugitive under the protection of Holkar's troops*".*

In all this, it is true, you merely echo Colonel Durand, who wrote in terms of complaint and blame,—though without producing any impression on the Government of India,—regarding the Commandant of Mhow, and the two Assistants who took up his duties when he had retired to a distance of two hundred miles from Indore. "*Why Captain Hungerford assumed the powers he did*", he could "*neither understand nor approve*",—it was understood and approved by the Viceroy in Council. "*Nor*" could he "*approve that men in the position of dependence upon Holkar, like Lieutenant Hutchinson and the occupants of the Mhow Fort, should assume the political functions of the Agent*",—although nobody knew where he was, and he neither wrote to his Assistants nor answered their letters,—"*and take upon themselves to judge the conduct of Holkar and the Durbar*".

You protest against Sir John Kaye saying that Colonel Durand "had disappeared from his charge, no one seemed to know whither, and that he did not answer Hungerford's letters. This", you say, "is untrue. The force from the Residency retired at a walk, and passed Holkar's roadside posts on the march towards Bhopal. The Durbar knew perfectly well in what direction it had retired, and that my father was within the limits of his charge, for Bhopal was as much a part of his charge as Indore." You are incapable, of course, of being disingenuous, but you seem to have overlooked the fact that Colonel Durand remained less than twenty-four hours at Bhopal, the Begum having explained her inability to protect him, and that he went on at once to Hoshungabad, a British station, two hundred miles from Indore, and not within the limits of his charge.

"He was", you continue, "throughout within two days' post, and he answered all letters sent to him."†

* Pp. 222, 223, 470, 471. † P. 471.

I think not,—I think he was not, to say the least, very prompt in acknowledging the letters he received from Indore and Mhow. For more than three weeks after his retreat nothing had been heard from Colonel Durand by any of his Assistants, by Captain Hungerford, who by force of circumstances had fallen into the charge both of military and political affairs, or by the Maharajah. They had all written to him, but the Agent would not vouchsafe a reply. Although, by his own account, "*communication was easy and rapid*,"* he stopped all communication for nearly a month with the English officers who were doing his work, and for more than a month with the Prince to whom he was accredited. Not a word of counsel or of encouragement came from him.

The first communication received by Holkar from Colonel Durand after the 1st of July, was an alarming letter dated Mhow, the 3rd of August 1857, containing two charges against his Highness, of having held aloof during the attack on the Residency, and of having allowed supplies and carriage to be furnished to the mutineers. The perverse and bitter spirit pervading this letter is, perhaps, most strongly exemplified by the first words in it that are intended for commendation. Colonel Durand says:—

> "I have no doubt that the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India will hear with satisfaction that you avoided the disgrace which would for ever have clung to your name, had you pusillanimously given up innocent persons who had sought refuge in your Palace, to be massacred by blood-thirsty miscreants."

He cannot even be so gracious as to say, "You have done well"; he can only say, "You have not acted like a pusillanimous wretch, or a blood-thirsty miscreant."

The man who could write in such a tone, at such a time, was emphatically "a bad political officer".

I shall introduce you to some little notes—you may verify them in "the Office"—which confirm my statements on this point, not yours. Before coming to these,

* Despatch to Government of India, No. 207, dated Mhow, 18th August 1857.

however, I must notice your new and very preposterous complaint that the officers who performed Colonel Durand's duties efficiently and successfully during his retirement, " were endeavouring to supplant him". This is too ridiculous. Were they to run away from Mhow because he fled from Indore? Were the two Assistants, Captain Hutchinson and Captain Elliot, to strike work because the Agent had disappeared? The period of Colonel Durand's absence had been well employed by the English gentlemen at Mhow, with Holkar's help, in restoring postal and telegraphic communications, in regaining a firm hold over local resources, and in smoothing the way for military operations. The Maharajah, fortified by friendly intercourse with our officers, was able to tranquillise the country, and to spread abroad a general impression that the cause of the insurgents was doomed. If Colonel Durand's Assistants had followed their superior's example, or if Captain Hungerford had shrunk from responsibility, Holkar and his Ministers, in the absence of any British political authority, would have lost much, if not all, of their influence for good, and the rebellious faction and predatory tribes of Malwa would have gained proportionate strength.

" It would be interesting to know", you say, " what these gentlemen would have done, if while they were acquitting themselves so much to their own and Holkar's satisfaction"—and, let me add, to the Viceroy's—" the man whom they were endeavouring to supplant had let the barrier of the Nerbudda drop behind them, and allowed Woodburn to march off to Nagpore."*

Colonel Durand had no authority over General Woodburn, and no influence whatever over the march of his column. I have never understood, and I have never met anyone who did understand, what you mean by this mysterious rubbish about " the barrier of the Nerbudda".

The following sentence in a letter, dated 12th of July, from Hungerford to Durand, does not look as if "these gentlemen" were very much afraid of "the barrier of the

* P. 471.

Nerbudda being dropped", and was innocently calculated to be very galling to Colonel Durand, an Engineer officer, if he and Colonel Travers had decided—as their messenger on the 1st of July 1857, reported—on not going to Mhow, because they believed that Holkar was going to attack it.

> "This fort, thanks to the hard labour of the Europeans, has been placed in such a state of defence, and we are so well provisioned, that it would take an army to attack it."

Six weeks after the receipt of this letter, Colonel Durand takes upon himself to say that, during his absence, Hungerford, Elliot, and Hutchinson had been "*in a position of dependence on Holkar*". Yet he gives no credit to Holkar, and objects to a "favourable report" being made on his Highness's "conduct".

For Colonel Durand thus continues :—

> "It was, however, an object with the Durbar to anticipate, if possible, a deliberate review of its conduct, by obtaining favourable reports and opinions which might clog after-measures, and these gentlemen all fell into the trap."

"So did Lord Elphinstone then", was the marginal comment of Mr. (afterwards Sir George F.) Edmonstone, the Foreign Secretary, on this passage in Colonel Durand's despatch of the 18th of August 1857. With reference to Colonel Durand's animadversions against Captain Hungerford, Mr. Edmonstone likewise made the following marginal note :—

> "The assumption of political functions by Captain Hungerford, and the manner in which he discharged those functions, have been warmly approved and commended by the Governor-General in Council. Colonel Durand did not keep these officers informed of his movements; nor, indeed, did he keep the Government informed. He left Hoshungabad about the 16th of July, and nothing was heard of him until he reappeared at Mhow. Captain Hungerford has already explained that Major Cooper ceded the command of the Mhow Fort in his favour, because Captain Hungerford was the only officer who had any troops to command. No troops were left except the European Battery."

In the same paragraph of his despatch of August 18th, 1857, Colonel Durand says :—" His Highness knows well that the Agency was never out of my charge, and that there was, therefore, no resuming of the Agency."

On this Mr. Edmonstone remarks :—" But neither Holkar nor anyone else knew what had become of Colonel Durand and his office."

Unfortunately, these notes and marginal comments, though prepared by high Ministerial officers for the aid and guidance of the Executive authorities, and often throwing much light on the progress and vicissitudes of a case, are not always forwarded home for the information of Her Majesty's Government. I shall bring a few more of them to your notice.

You urge that your father's " influence", and his alleged " prejudices" and " misrepresentations", could not " have kept Holkar out of his due"; that the Maharajah had " a steady advocate in Sir Robert Hamilton, and had perfectly impartial judges. Lord Canning, Lord Lawrence, and Lord Mayo, during my father's life", you continue, " Lord Northbrook and Lord Lytton, after his death, and the various Secretaries of State concerned, were surely capable of forming an opinion for themselves."*

Certainly they were, if the proper materials for " forming an opinion" had ever been placed before them. But, as I shall show, " the Office" has ruled the Empire ; " the Service" has conspired against an impartial judgment. In the words of Sir John Kaye, " Holkar has been sacrificed to the justification of Durand."† A vague denunciation of Holkar was convenient as a screen for Colonel Durand's failure and flight. Colonel Durand had committed himself, by his declarations and his movements, to a prejudiced view of Holkar's conduct. He had reported that he was " attacked by Holkar", and that " Holkar's treachery was of the true Mahratta stamp". Under that suspicion he had left the precincts of his charge at the critical moment, and had, in particular, kept away from the military station at Mhow, where he

* P. 470. † *Sepoy War*, vol. iii, p. 346.

would have been quite safe and at his post. Subsequent inquiries, instituted by himself, entirely negatived every suspicion against Holkar. He could not justify these unfounded suspicions, or the false movement into which they had misled him. But he never distinctly renounced them. On the contrary, he came back to them again and again, in every form but that of a formal report, or of an intelligible accusation. He kept up the bad impression by his personal presence and influence in high office for eleven years, and it was carried on and heightened by his colleagues and successors. Rules and principles of Executive procedure have been set aside, and records have been misrepresented, with no better motive than private and professional sympathy. The result is that a Prince of the Indian Empire, who did good service in time of need, is branded with a false charge of cowardice and treachery—for that is what it amounts to—without the foundation of any official report or statement, in defiance of the only official report on his conduct that ever was made, by the suppression of existing evidence, and the suggestion of evidence that has never existed.

Two Secretaries of State, one of whom is now in the Cabinet—Lord Derby and Lord Halifax—have in vain issued instructions and expressed wishes in favour of justice being done to this injured and slandered Prince. The Viceroys and the Secretaries of State have been unable to contend against departmental earwigging, and the misuse of records in Calcutta.

The Indian Foreign Secretary is, as you say, "the responsible adviser and right hand of the Viceroy". Upon him and his Assistants devolves the important duty of collecting and laying before the Viceroy and his Councillors all the papers bearing on each case awaiting decision, usually with an "Office-note", summarising its history, and frequently submitting an opinion on the merits, and some suggestion for a settlement. I shall show that with regard to the conduct and services of the Maharajah Holkar in 1857 this duty was not performed in good faith by the Political Department, but was perverted for the

exculpation of Sir Henry Durand, and that thus the Viceroys and Secretaries of State were prevented from "forming an opinion for themselves". Very naturally relying on the guidance of their Ministerial subordinates, they were led to overlook the fact that all the formal documents of the time bore witness to the Maharajah Holkar's fidelity and active help, and that there was no official report or statement on record condemnatory of his Highness's conduct on any particular day or in any particular incident. The permanent officers of the Calcutta Foreign Department offered certain gratuitous and obscure expressions of dislike and ill-will against the Maharajah Holkar, which seem to have been taken as if they were founded on some adverse report or statement against his Highness, written at the period in question. No such document exists.

I shall show that in 1870, the occasion demanding something more than these obscure expressions of dislike, a hostile statement was at last presented by Mr. (now Sir Charles) Aitchison, sufficiently definite in its purport, but without any foundation or verification of an official nature,—contradicted, in fact, by documents which Mr. Aitchison did not bring forward.

It is by the suppression of the truth as officially reported, and the suggestion of false matter or malignant fancy in conversation, private correspondence, and secret "Office-notes", that Holkar has been "kept out of his due", and our statesmen kept in the dark. I make no complaint of official routine. Ordinary routine has been set aside and violated throughout these proceedings. The distinguishing peculiarity of Holkar's case is, that if any Viceroy or Secretary of State, dissatisfied with vague imputations and hints of "awkward revelations" in reserve, were to call for any official report condemning Holkar's conduct on the 1st of July 1857, it could not be produced, for no such official report exists. There is nothing definite or intelligible on official record against the Maharajah Holkar. He has been publicly condemned and deprived of his promised reward on the strength of secret hints and surmises; and whenever one of these involves

an allegation of fact, a very brief and simple inquiry invariably proves that allegation to be untrue.

When it seemed, from the lapse of time, that you had no intention of answering my book, published in 1877, I began to hope that I had done with you and with Sir Henry Durand. Even when the advocate's duty, the just cause and the strong case, are all equally clear, the task of refutation, exposure, and detraction cannot be agreeable. You have compelled me to resume it most unwillingly by your unjustifiable charge against me of having published "a tissue of untruth". And though the task is rendered imperative by your book, it is not rendered more congenial to my nature. I must not dwell on the subject, but I may be allowed simply to claim for myself, even in your estimation, those homely human feelings that can honour filial reverence for a personality in which there was assuredly much to be admired and much to be loved. Nor have I, let me assure you, been able to read unmoved the details of that sad and strange fatality which ended a distinguished and laborious career at a moment of hardly earned success, or of the still more sad and affecting fatality that may well have made your father think for ever after of "Mhow and Indore" with "the same feelings" of "burning, because suppressed, indignation" and of "boiling wrath".*

I wish I could say no more. But my ungracious duty must be fulfilled. There is nothing, then, in your book to dispel, and much to confirm, the impression of Colonel Durand's character commonly entertained by his contemporaries, that he was a man with whom, to use a colloquialism, it was "difficult to get on",—a *mauvais coucheur*,—a man who was intolerant of his neighbours' objects and opinions when they diverged from his own, and who was morbidly over-conscious of his own merits and claims. The numerous passages in your book tending to confirm that impression may be said to culminate in that extraordinary sentence written by him in 1864:—

* See pp. 227, 228, 291.

"Bare justice is not what I have had meted out to me through life. I speak of man, not God."*

At least, it may be said, he drew the line somewhere in his protest against the want of appreciation in high places. If he did not bear his crosses and his losses as patiently as Job, he did not go quite so far in his complaints against the powers that be as Job's wife suggested.

He did not get on well with Lord Lawrence when the latter was Viceroy. Lord Lawrence writes as follows to the Secretary of State, in a letter dated March 13, 1868:—

"I may say with perfect truth that I was instrumental in Sir Henry Durand getting his seat in Council. Nevertheless, ever since he entered it, I have had difficulties in managing matters with him. He is so unbending, so acrimonious, that it is hard to work with him."

Lord Lawrence's biographer, forming his judgment not only from the documents at his disposal, but also, as he says, from "conversations with other members of the Council, and high officials who were best acquainted with all the circumstances", pronounces Sir Henry Durand to have displayed habitually "a highly impracticable temper in public matters", and when in Council to have "acted as though he were inclined to oppose every measure which did not originate with himself."†

But he was not in Council when Lord Lawrence arrived in India in 1864. He was then Secretary to Government in the Foreign and Political Department, and in that capacity, as you tell us, he got on badly with the Viceroy. And one great cause of their difference was, you inform us, the style and character of Colonel Durand's "Office-notes". That is a very curious and interesting fact in connection with the matter in hand, because "Office-notes", prepared and submitted at each stage of the proceedings by the gentleman who for the time being

* P. 315.

† *Life of Lord Lawrence*, by R. Bosworth Smith, M.A. (Smith, Elder, and Co., 1883), vol. ii, p. 534.

was "the right hand of the Viceroy", have been, as I shall prove—and as you are well aware—the chief engines for Holkar's confusion. The differences with regard to these "Office-notes" rose to such a height, you say, that at last the Governor-General issued orders "that all Foreign Office work should be submitted to him without note or opinion".* Whether the first Office-note of the series I shall cite, written by Colonel Durand and dated the 4th of August 1864, was one of those to which Lord Lawrence objected, I have no means of knowing, but it will strike most people, I think, as being well calculated to call forth such a prohibition. You can look at the original in the Office, and satisfy yourself on this point, and on the accuracy of my citation.†

Sir John Lawrence, Viceroy of India, sends a memorandum to the Foreign Office on the 1st of August 1864, stating that the Secretary of State, Sir Charles Wood (now Viscount Halifax) has written, under date 4th July, requesting that he "will take care that Holkar receives certain advantages in reward for his conduct during the Mutiny, as promised to him by Lord Canning", and he calls for "the particular papers which bear on this point". Colonel Durand, Foreign Secretary, desired that they should be previously sent to him by Mr. Aitchison, the Under Secretary, with a note. Mr. Aitchison's note, dated 3rd August 1864, embodied a statement as to alleged liberal concessions and compensations that had been granted to Holkar, and ended by saying that there was no trace in the Foreign Office records "that Sir Robert Hamilton was ever instructed to make any promise to Holkar at all". Lord Lawrence remarks on this :—

"But Lord Canning must have written to Sir Robert Hamilton demi-officially, for Sir Charles Wood tells me, as a matter beyond all doubt, that a promise was made and communicated in open Durbar."

One of the concessions to Holkar mentioned in Mr. Aitchison's note was the repayment of the expense of

* P. 321. † Appendix C, The Secret Papers.

troops raised by his Highness during the rebellion to replace our mutinied Contingents—no reward or "donation", of course—and it is to this that Colonel Durand alludes in the following note, which also accompanied the papers:—

"I refer to my note of the 6th of December 1863, from which it will be seen that the three lakhs' charge made by Holkar was ridiculous, and that the Governor-General made him a pure donation when his Excellency allowed that sum to be paid to Holkar. The latter has got, therefore, all that Lord Canning thought he should get. He was, also, given the Star of India—why, no one could ever make out—and it deteriorated the value of the decoration in the eyes of those who, like the Begum of Bhopal, knew Holkar's conduct.

4-8-64. "H. M. Durand."

Here we find Colonel Durand appealing to a bad opinion of Holkar entertained by the Begum of Bhopal. You have already brought him before us declaring that Lord Elphinstone eventually gave up the good opinion of Holkar, which, in his Lordship's recorded words, "had come from too many sources to admit of any doubt".* This "Office-note" is thus extremely remarkable in itself, and worthy of our attention at present, both with reference to the occasion that called it forth, and to the occasion that has compelled me to come forward.

Colonel Durand, in 1864, wishing to cry down Holkar as a false and recreant Prince, cannot "make out" why the Star of India was conferred on his Highness by Her Majesty the Queen. In 1884, you, with the same object, now become essential as an apology for your father's procedure, cannot "make out" why the "territorial reward", assigned to Holkar by Her Majesty's Government and by the Viceroy, has been refused and is withheld. You acknowledge at last, what no one had ever previously been able to extract, that Colonel Durand unofficially and secretly set down Holkar as "a participator with the mutineers", but you cannot "make out" why he did so. With all your "scattered references" you cannot "make out" what your father meant. You

* *Ante*, p. 25.

do your very best. You call Mr. Dickinson "a pamphleteer"; you suggest that all who have defended Holkar are either "paid agitators" or "ignorant enthusiasts". Although, you say, it would have been "easy" to answer my book, you "do not attempt it". Instead of the "refutation" of "a string of misstatements", which, you say, would have been "easy", you offer the very characteristic story about the "pig-lead", and the very questionable invocation of Lord Elphinstone. That is all that you can "make out" in 1883.

And all that Colonel Durand could "make out" in 1864 was that Holkar ought not to have had the Star of India, and that the Begum of Bhopal "knew Holkar's conduct". As to what Lord Elphinstone knew, you are quite silent. Colonel Durand was equally silent as to what the Begum of Bhopal knew.

These are notable specimens of the "tact, firmness, and judicial aptitude"* which you, no doubt, assume to be hereditary and inherent in the Calcutta Foreign Office. For my part, I am quite confident that to all impartial readers a very distinct impression of the weakness, even to nullity, of Colonel Durand's imputations, and of the strength of his rancour against Holkar, will be given by the tenor and temper of the brief note in which the Calcutta Secretary even goes out of his way to impugn the grant of honours by Her Majesty—a matter quite beyond his province. With what political or judicial propriety, in what logical connection, was the name of the Begum of Bhopal invoked to point a sarcasm against Holkar? Even if she could have been called upon for her testimony, in place of that which Colonel Durand had never supplied, or for her opinion, in support of Colonel Durand's solitary prejudice, what could she have known in July 1857, 100 miles off, more than was known by the British officers at Mhow? It must be remembered that on the 9th of July, when Colonel Durand was writing to Bombay and Calcutta that Holkar's "*treachery*" was "*palpable*", and "*of the true Mahratta stamp*", Holkar had already been for four days in close intercourse and active co-operation

* Pp. 280, 281.

with the Commandant of Mhow, and three columns of the Maharajah's troops were out in concert with our officers. In all probability Colonel Durand was merely recalling to mind in 1864 something that he had told the Begum of Bhopal himself in 1857 during the perturbation of his flying visit, and not anything that could possibly have come within the Begum's own cognisance. This is, in all probability, the sole basis of the assumption that Lord Elphinstone's opinion was altered. Colonel Durand privately gave free expression to his loose guesses as to Holkar's "waiting game", and Lord Elphinstone, who was a man of exquisite courtesy, did not rudely put him down. The strange invocation of the Begum of Bhopal, as a witness or a judge, by the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, passed, likewise, without the animadversion it deserved in the Council Chamber at Calcutta, and was, unfortunately, never forwarded to London. The adverse opinions already recorded were once more sent, in reply to Sir Charles Wood's requisition, accompanied by Mr. Aitchison's unfavourable report, but, under Sir John Lawrence's direction, *without* Colonel Durand's note. If Sir Charles Wood had seen that note he could hardly have failed to detect its weakness, its malice, and its impropriety.

But I am really not sure that the eccentric note of the 4th of August 1864, is the worst specimen from your Office that I have to produce.

The mystery of Lord Canning's and Lord Lawrence's refusal to do justice to Holkar is almost entirely cleared up by the personal presence and influence of Colonel Durand for eleven years, from 1859 to 1870. The assumption of his local and immediate knowledge supplied every deficiency in the records, and superseded everything that conflicted with his irregular imputations. But in July 1870 there were great grounds of hope that Holkar's claim would receive impartial consideration. Sir Henry Durand was no longer present at head-quarters. He had been appointed Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjaub. The Viceroy, Lord Mayo, well disposed after a personal interview with his Highness, promptly repelled

an attempt by the permanent officials to reject or impede the Maharajah's appeal on a point of etiquette or form. Mr. Aitchison, the assistant and successor of Colonel Durand at the Calcutta Foreign Office, happened, also, to be temporarily absent at the commencement of the proceedings of 1870. These favourable conditions were, however, made of no effect, just as the Viceregal Government was on the verge of perceiving the truth, by the personal intervention of Mr. Aitchison, immediately on his return.

In 1864, Colonel Durand, unable to produce any testimony or official statement describing Holkar's misconduct, invokes the Begum of Bhopal as a witness or a judge of something he does not specify.

In 1870, Mr. Aitchison, equally unable to produce any testimony or official statement, gives for the first time a description of Holkar's misconduct as if it had come from official records, but really in flagrant contradiction to authentic records which might have been, but were not, produced.

In the absence of Mr. Aitchison, Mr. LePoer Wynne, his Assistant, had stumbled over the strange fact that Colonel Durand had promised to report on "the conduct of Holkar and his troops"; and although Mr. LePoer Wynne was assured in the Calcutta Foreign Office that "no such paper had ever been received", "much search" was made, under his directions, and he announces "a renewed search", these "missing papers" being most "*important as illustrating the reasons which induced Lord Canning and Lord Lawrence to refuse a territorial reward*".

It was time for some one better acquainted than Mr. LePoer Wynne with all the previous incidents to stop this critical inquiry, which, if pushed on too far, must have disclosed the fact that there was nothing on record as to any misconduct on the part of Holkar or the Durbar. There was nothing to "illustrate" the previous adverse conclusions but vague rumours, and the menacing promise of a report, which was "missing". The total deficiency of "reasons" as to Holkar's forfeiture struck Mr. LePoer Wynne as a very remarkable point.

Mr. Aitchison came back at this crisis. He knew, of course, that no papers were missing, but in his supplementary "Office-note" he does not refer to Mr. LePoer Wynne's bootless research. He does not mention Colonel Durand's name. Mr. (now Sir Charles) Aitchison can alone explain whence he extracted the stuff which he laid before the Viceroy in Council as the evidence, and the "reasons" which Mr. LePoer Wynne declared to be wanting. He quotes no despatch; he names no informant; but, by a direct accusation against the Maharajah Holkar of coquetting with treason for four days, he covers up the bare place which Mr. LePoer Wynne had so inconveniently displayed. Here are Mr. Aitchison's own words in a note dated 5th August 1870:—

"There is this difference between Holkar and those Chiefs who have received territorial rewards, that *Holkar did not, like them, at the first burst of the mutiny, take that open and decided part with us that he ought to have done. The attack upon the Indore Residency occurred on the* 1*st July*, 1857. *It was not till the* 5*th that he took any decided steps to show with which cause he intended to throw in his lot.*"

Mr. Aitchison makes a charge against Holkar of having wavered and hesitated for four days. Now he proceeds to explain how base the motives were under which that hesitation at last came to an end.

"*During these four days our position at Mhow had been rendered secure by the vigorous measures adopted by Captain Hungerford. There was no longer any doubt as to the strength of our position. Accordingly,* on the 5th of July, the bodies of the slain were buried by Holkar's order, *and the Maharajah on that date, and not before, sent a deputation to Mhow to express his regret at what had occurred.* I think, *therefore*, that Lord Canning took a thoroughly just view of the Maharajah's services when, in his despatch, No. 6, of 18th January, 1860, he wrote," quoting the passage in full, that Holkar's "conduct" was unworthy of "either respect or gratitude".

These, in short, are the "reasons", hitherto "missing", "which induced Lord Canning and Lord Lawrence to refuse a territorial reward". Colonel Durand's declamatory prejudices, detected and rebuked by Lord Elphinstone at Bombay, had struck deep root in the official

circle at Calcutta. Here we have them reproduced by Mr. Aitchison, when pressed for evidence and reasons, in the form of definite and injurious charges against Holkar. What was Mr. Aitchison's authority for the inaccurate story with which he misled Lord Mayo? Whether he received it as scripture or as tradition, its inaccuracy is manifest and indisputable.

Mr. Aitchison says that "*Holkar did not, at the first burst of the mutiny, take an open and decided part with us*", and that "*Holkar took no decided steps to show with which cause he intended to throw in his lot*" until the 5th of July. He says that "this is the difference between Holkar and those Chiefs who have received territorial rewards": and the despatch consequent on these proceedings, points to this as the "clear and broad distinction between the case of Holkar on one side, and those of Scindia and of the Begum of Bhopal on the other". But there was no real ground for any unfavourable distinction between the conduct of Holkar "at the first burst of the mutiny", and that of Scindia and the Begum of Bhopal; or if there was any distinction, it was entirely in favour of Holkar. There was no more truth in the distinction between Holkar and Scindia, than there was in the distinction, which you vainly imagine to have been meant as favourable to Holkar, between the Maharajah and his Durbar.

In briefly referring to the difficulties which assailed the rulers of Gwalior and Bhopal in the great convulsive crisis of 1857, and of the temporising expedients to which they had to resort, there is no wish to detract from their great services. I am deprecating, not instituting, an invidious comparison.

When, on the mutiny breaking out at Gwalior, the Resident, Colonel Macpherson, sought refuge at the Palace, Scindia declared that, in consequence of the feeling of his troops, "he could not protect" him "for an hour". The Resident therefore left Gwalior for Agra.* When Colonel Durand, in his retreat from Indore, arrived

* *Return to the Lords* (77 of 1860), *Honours and Rewards*, pp. 102, 103.

at Sehore, the capital of Bhopal, the Begum expressed her inability to shelter him or any English officer at her capital, or in her dominions. Colonel Durand, therefore, instantly left Bhopal, and made for the British cantonment of Hoshungabad.

For fully four months, from the 14th of June to the 15th of October 1857, Scindia was only able to restrain the mutineers of the Gwalior Contingent—in the words of Colonel Macpherson, the Political Agent—by donations of pay, and "by the delusion that he must at length place himself at the head of the rebels".* Holkar was not compelled to carry temporising expedients to such an extremity. He was not reduced to disguise his adherence to the British cause for a day, or for an hour. On the very day of the outbreak he openly resisted it. On the very day of the first outburst of the mutinies at Indore and Mhow, Holkar did noble service. Although he could not communicate with the Governor-General's Agent during the terrible hour and a half that preceded his retreat, the Maharajah apprehended the leader of the outbreak and kept him in charge during the most dangerous crisis; he sent back to the scene of bloodshed and confusion the misguided leader of his detachment, with orders that must have damped the ardour of all who feared or hoped anything from their own Prince; he stopped any reinforcement of the mutineers and rabble engaged in attacking the Residency; checked the concourse that would otherwise have flocked there with irresistible effect, and prevented the pursuit of Colonel Durand. It is almost certain that by remaining close to his Palace, keeping as tight a hold as was possible for some time over the bulk of his troops, he did much more good than if he had started for the Residency in the midst of an infuriate crowd, ignorant of his real intentions, but bent on mischief themselves.

Holkar, moreover, on the very day of the outbreak, and in the words of Sir Robert Hamilton, "at the risk of his own life", saved within his Palace the lives of a number of Europeans, East Indian and Christian subjects

* *Return to the Lords* (77 of 1860), *Honours and Rewards*, p. 107.

of the Queen. On that very day he sent a deputation to the British authorities at Mhow, and sent off letters to Colonel Durand and to Lord Elphinstone, the Governor of Bombay.

Mr. Aitchison says that on the 1st of July 1857, Holkar did not "take an open and decided part with us"; that "it was not till the 5th that he took any decided steps to show with which cause he intended to throw in his lot"; and that "on that date, and not before, he sent a deputation to Mhow". But there were then within Mr. Aitchison's reach despatches proving that Holkar had sent a deputation to Mhow on the 1st of July, the day of the outbreak, and that he had never hesitated or ceased for an hour to take an open and decided part on our side.*

This new indictment was, nevertheless, quite enough for Lord Mayo, when he was assured by Mr. Aitchison that it had sufficed for Lord Canning. "For my own part", says Lord Mayo, "I am quite satisfied with the description given in the Secretary's note of Holkar's actions at the time of the mutiny." That description, with the accompanying inferences and surmises, was not only unsupported by the records at Mr. Aitchison's disposal, but was contradicted by them.

The adverse decision was, in due course, conveyed in the form of a letter to the Governor-General's Agent at Indore, dated 10th November 1870, in which the Maharajah is told again that although graciously "overlooked", in consideration of the services he "subsequently rendered", his conduct on the day of the outbreak not having been worthy of "either the respect or the gratitude of the British Government", necessitated "a clear and broad distinction" between his case and those of Scindia and the Begum of Bhopal, and "invalidated" his claim "to an acknowledgment of his services by the extension of his territory".

In the same letter, the Maharajah is, moreover, told that he has received certain "pecuniary concessions" and "substantial marks of favour", which constitute "a

* Appendix D, "The Deputation to Mhow".

cordial appreciation" of his services, and a sufficient reward for them. Even if it could be shown that the transactions detailed in the despatch were exclusively beneficial to Holkar, which he denies, the argument would still be quite irrelevant. The question is not of incidental concessions or courtesies or compliments, but of a condemnatory sentence, and of a promised reward withheld on account of it.

It became the duty of Major-General Sir Henry Daly, Agent to the Governor-General, to communicate the contents of this despatch to the Maharajah, and to leave him a copy of it. In the conversation which ensued, as narrated by Sir Henry Daly, in a despatch dated "Indore Residency, 21st November 1870", his Highness, "speaking quietly and calmly", said: "I see Lord Mayo can do nothing for me, that nothing can be done in India, therefore I must press my case in every possible way in England." In order to dissuade him from taking this course, the Agent urged upon Holkar that it would be most imprudent for him to brave an open discussion or to court publicity. In Sir Henry Daly's own words, "*I endeavoured to impress upon his Highness the pain which would certainly fall upon him by dragging to light events which the Government of India will willingly let sleep, that the British officers who were in the Residency at Indore on the 1st of July are still living, and that should he force an inquiry, the evidence of the Natives, too, would tend to prove on that day, at any rate, the Maharajah had not chosen our part.*"

It is obvious, from Sir Henry Daly's silence on that point, that the Maharajah showed no apprehension as to the publication which Sir Henry Daly "endeavoured to impress upon" him "would certainly" cause him "pain". The Maharajah made no objection to "events being dragged to light". Sir Henry Daly, in short, completely failed in "impressing upon his Highness", as he had wished, the imprudence of "forcing an inquiry". He totally failed, likewise, in creating any alarm in his Highness's mind at the prospect of the despatch of the 10th of November 1870, being published, "*for*

public information"—"*in order that the merits of the case might be generally understood*". Sir Henry Daly is a very distinguished soldier; and the Government of India may have had better material for estimating his diplomatic and judicial capacity than this one instance of an offensive exhortation, aimed point blank at a Prince in person, and quite missing its mark. It is worthy of notice that Sir Henry Daly having completely failed in his object, seems to have been incapable of appreciating or even perceiving the significance of his failure. What his failure really meant was that no evidence, British or Native, against Holkar, had ever existed.

Mr. Aitchison, in an "Office-note" sent round with Sir Henry Daly's despatch, thinks that "for the present it would be very improper to publish the papers, but if Holkar begins to agitate, Colonel Daly's proposal is not a bad one". Holkar, Mr. Aitchison also says, "will act very foolishly if he begins to agitate his case at home, and *will force Government to make awkward revelations of his conduct during the first four days after the outbreak at Indore.*"

The combined assurance of these two high functionaries must have only tended still more to the satisfaction of a Viceroy in Council already contented with Mr. Aitchison's "description of Holkar's actions". It made such an impression upon one Councillor, Sir Richard Temple, that he at once minuted as follows:—"*If Holkar 'tries it on', and gets his 'face blackened' in consequence, his Highness will have himself to thank.*"

And yet there was not then, and there is not now, any such evidence as that which Sir Henry Daly conjured up in vain for the intimidation of Holkar. There were not then, and there are not now, any "*awkward revelations*" held in reserve, which could "blacken Holkar's face". You have not been able "to make out" anything, with all your "scattered references".

If any hostile evidence had been recorded or attainable, if any "*awkward revelations*" had really been kept in the background, some hint of them must have come out in

the course of these proceedings. But there is no such hint or trace. Every deliberate report, everything that is in official form and order, is favourable to Holkar. Everything that is against him is vague in sense, and irregular in form. When Colonel Durand was driven to say something in 1864, he could only express his feelings by a mysterious invocation of the Begum of Bhopal, and an indiscreet impeachment of Her Majesty's prerogative. When Mr. Aitchison was closely pressed in 1870 on account of "the missing papers", he could not cite anything official, but had to draw his condemnatory "description of Holkar's actions" from some private or personal source without a name.

The case, as now presented, is a very simple one. It is narrowed to the direct citation of two living persons, Sir Charles Aitchison, Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjaub, and General Sir Henry Daly, who resides in this country. The judgment of independent politicians, and even of Ministers, has always been on the side of the injured and insulted Prince; but officialism supports its professional colleague, statesmanship is baffled and defied, and a Prince's honour is sacrificed to an Agent's credit. On the other side, there was until 1870 only one accuser—an accuser who brought no charge—Colonel Durand. For eleven years the disgrace and deprivation of the Maharajah Holkar depended on the inexplicit vilifications, secretly reiterated in 1864, of Colonel Durand, and on his almost constant presence. So the matter stood until 1870. From that year Sir Charles Aitchison and Sir Henry Daly are morally responsible. On the "description of Holkar's actions" by Sir Charles Aitchison, also secretly recorded, the decision of 1870 is expressly grounded,—that being the only adverse decision in which any grounds of judgment have ever been set forth.

Until Mr. Aitchison's "description of Holkar's actions", there was not on record, even in secret, one distinct or intelligible word explaining what was the Maharajah's misconduct "at the time of the mutiny" which had rendered him unworthy of "either respect or gratitude", and created the "broad distinction" in favour of the Begum

of Bhopal and Scindia. In his "Office-note" of the 5th of August 1870, Mr. Aitchison gives the much required and missing word, quite distinct and intelligible, but quite unwarranted. This "description of Holkar's actions" satisfied Lord Mayo, because he naturally assumed that it was drawn from official records. It was not. It was unauthenticated even as an accusation. It was quite new, and quite untrue.

At the same crisis, when the redress of a great wrong was within reach of Lord Mayo, Sir Henry Daly, by alleging that there was "evidence", both European and Native, of Holkar's misconduct, confirmed the unfounded statement by which Sir Charles Aitchison had "satisfied" the Viceroy.

These two living accusers have rejected a personal challenge to justify or withdraw their accusations, which I felt bound to offer for their acceptance. It is natural and easy for them, with all their advantages of position and prescription, to revile and ridicule my mission. I certainly have no power to force an answer from them. Evidently I have no power to extort an answer from you. My book was so sure "to die a natural death" that you would not refute it, although the task would have been, you think, an easy one. You may now flatter yourself, and may be flattered in the narrow circle of Chowringhee or Simla, into the belief that this Letter demands no more attention, because you could, if you chose, refute it likewise. But in the much larger circle I address, and where I shall be heard, the vapouring evasions of your class will not avail you.

It will not avail to say that the acts of Sir Charles Aitchison and of Sir Henry Daly have obtained the approval and confirmation of the Government of India. That superior sanction, as I have shown, was wrongfully obtained. In their unjustifiable treatment of the Maharajah Holkar's appeal, those two gentlemen must have been actuated and biassed—almost unconsciously, I believe—by considerations and motives neither judicial nor political, but private, personal, and professional. In common charity I am driven to refer to the prevailing

Anglo-Indian prejudices of race and class, because I see no milder method of accounting for Mr. Aitchison's unwarrantable "description of Holkar's actions on the day of the meeting", or for Sir Henry Daly's equally unwarrantable declaration as to "evidence" of the Maharajah's misconduct.

Sir Henry Daly and Sir Charles Aitchison, and a great many Anglo-Indian officials, like yourself, probably had, and have now, a feeling that the unretracted bad word of a British dignitary like Sir Henry Durand is as good as evidence against a Mahratta Prince, and ought to counterbalance all opposing testimony. But you, as a barrister-at-law, ought to know that this is a very serious error. It is, likewise, more than probable that in Anglo-Indian official circles, at home and abroad, a feeling would prevail that a highly placed member of the Civil or Military Service is, from every point of view, a person of far greater consequence, of more importance and value to the Empire, than any Nawab or Rajah. But this, also, is a very great mistake. The truth is not to be rejected because the Ministerial officer who, under some strange misconception, put it aside, and put something else in its place in 1870, is now the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjaub. Lieutenant-Governors come and go. The House of Holkar is firmly rooted in the soil, and is an invaluable factor in the conservative equilibrium of India. Were it just, it would not be politic to outrage and disregard the permanent realities of the Empire, in order to uphold an error, or to screen from discredit for a time the mere accident of a day and a Department.

The supply of officials, even of Secretaries, Political Agents, and Lieutenant-Governors, quite up to the average standard, is constant and practically unlimited. But Princes of the Empire, though easily destroyed or disheartened, cannot be made and cannot be replaced, either by patronage or by competitive examination.

The Indian Principalities, the self-governed provinces, are, and always have been, not accidental, but essential, constituents of British power in India. Our Indian

Empire would never have come into being, and cannot continue to flourish or to exist, without them. Without Native allies, Great Britain could not have won her way to virtual supremacy between 1756 and 1819. Without the aid and influence of the Indian Princes, the mutinies of 1857 would have swelled into a general rebellion, so tremendous that the restoration of British rule could only have taken place at an incalculable cost, and with horrible and ruinous results of devastation and disorganisation.

The mere existence of the Princes, irrespective of their active aid or countenance on our side, prevented the rebels from getting leaders of weight and capacity, and from obtaining anything like a political centre or even a belligerent status. The Nizam's authority was invaluable in the Deccan, and was more or less of a restraint over Mohammedan fanaticism in every part of India. The good effect produced by the combined support of Holkar and Scindia throughout Hindostan and Malwa can hardly be over-estimated. But during the most critical months of 1857 and 1858, when the provinces round Delhi and Lucknow were in full revolt, Holkar stood alone in Malwa and Central India; for Scindia was a fugitive—his Durbar and army had "gone", and he was only able to return to Gwalior in June 1858, escorted by British troops. The influence of Holkar was, also, pre-eminent among the Mahrattas of Western India. "All the smaller Chiefs", said Lord Elphinstone, "seem to take their cue from him." In a remarkable article which appeared in the *Quarterly Review* for July 1858, well known to have been from the pen of Mr. (now the Right Honourable Sir Henry) Layard, who had lately returned from a tour through India, while the rebellion was at its height, the writer attributes "the maintenance of our rule in India to the fidelity of the Nizam of the Deccan, Scindia, Holkar, and the Rajah of Putteeala", and adds: "The Presidency of Bombay has been saved only by the energy, foresight, and judgment of Lord Elphinstone, although its army was on the eve of revolt, and its population,

especially that of the Mahratta country, ready for insurrection."*

As to the condition of Central India, take the following extract of a letter from Sir John Lawrence to Lord Stanley: —

"June 16, 1858.

"Gwalior has fallen into the hands of the mutineers, with, I fear, a couple of millions of treasure. Unless we can retake it, which is at least problematical, a general insurrection throughout the Mahratta States may be anticipated. Central India is a strong country, difficult for military operations; and, with plenty of money, soldiers can be procured in any numbers."†

This gives force and strong confirmation to the following passage in Sir Robert Hamilton's letter of the 26th of April 1858,—the only official report on the conduct of Holkar and his Durbar in 1857 that was ever made:—

"What has really foiled them has been the personal fidelity of Holkar, Scindia, and Baiza Baee. Had any one of these declared for the Peishwa, our difficulties would have been beyond conception; the smaller thakoors and rural chiefs would have instantly joined the standard of their sovereign; every village would have been openly hostile."‡

And here is a similar extract from one of Earl Canning's published despatches:—

"There is no doubt that if the Mahratta plots in the West had not, by active operations on a comparatively small scale, been nipped in the bud, the great body of rebels in the East—that is, in Central India, Bundelcund, and near the Jumna—would have acquired much greater strength for resistance on a large scale."§

You can, confessedly, "make out" nothing against these historical facts with your "scattered references", nor can they be nullified either by Colonel Durand's equivocal sneer of 1864, or by Mr. Aitchison's novel figment of 1870. As you have nothing else to offer, I cannot doubt that from your disclosures alone, without

* *Quarterly Review*, July 1858, p. 265.

† *Life of Lord Lawrence*, by R. Bosworth Smith (Smith, Elder, and Co.), vol. ii, p. 302.

‡ *Return to the Lords* (77 of 1860), p. 116.

§ Military Letter from the Viceroy in Council to the Secretary of State, dated 4th April 1861, No. 45.—*Papers*, 498 of 1863, p. 5.

the aid of my comments and my additional revelations, impartial readers will begin to have grave misgivings as to the "tact and firmness", the "sympathy with the feelings of rulers and people", the integrity and the public spirit, with which the work of the Foreign and Political Department is carried on—the chief place in which, you say, "is regarded as the blue riband of the Civil Service", "an almost certain stepping-stone to the highest posts in the Empire".

God help the Empire, when those who have stepped into its highest posts are possessed by such "tact" and such "firmness", such "sympathy with rulers and people", such "judicial aptitude", and such public spirit, as have been displayed by Sir Henry Durand, Sir Charles Aitchison, and yourself, in your dealings with our "loyal, steadfast, and faithful ally",* the Maharajah Tookajee Rao Holkar.

But you have yet another specific offence, in addition to the "pig-lead" affair, to lay to the charge of the Maharajah Holkar. "Not many years ago", you say, "the Governor-General was forced to return one of his memorials as containing remarks regarding my father and Lord Canning, which were positively intolerable."† Yes, the Governor-General was "forced". That is the very word. Lord Northbrook, *who had then been about a week at Calcutta*, was misled by Mr. Aitchison, his "right hand", and keeper of the papers, as completely as Lord Mayo had been, by the very safe and convenient device of not allowing him to see the papers at all. Redress was refused to Holkar in 1872 by the absolute rejection of his memorial, without hearing or consideration, on the ground of his having "presumed to write of the Governor-General's Agent, Sir Henry Durand, and even of the late Viceroy, Lord Canning, in highly unbecoming and objectionable terms". Leaving out of consideration its evasive character and object, this is a plea quite peculiar to Anglo-Indian officialism. It seems to me to be very feeble and very unjudicial.

* *Return to the Lords* (77 of 1860), p. 119.

† P. 462.

If it should be urged that the reputation and credit of the late Sir Henry Durand are more precious than those of Sir Robert Hamilton, who is living, or that more faith ought to be placed in the infallibility of the late Lord Canning than in the judgment of the present Earl of Derby or of Viscount Halifax, I can only say that all these considerations appear to me to be wide of the mark. Respect ought certainly to be paid to the memory and reputation of the dead, but not at the expense and to the dishonour of the living, or at the risk of public mischief. This is a question of truth and justice, and of great political import, not one of personal deference or forbearance. For example, Holkar is living. The unjustified maintenance of this calumny is not merely an injury to that Prince, his House and State, but is an unpurged and unrebuked offence against the Imperial Crown and the British Government of India. This is pre-eminently a case in which it may be said, *Nullum tempus occurrit Regi*. There can be no term of limitation for the redress of a calumny which has misled the Viceroy, and frustrated the declared intentions of Her Majesty's Government.

Sir Henry Durand, who hastily denounced and persistently maligned Holkar, is dead. Lord Elphinstone, who eulogised Holkar, and warned Sir Henry Durand "not to harbour prejudices" against the Maharajah, is also dead. Sir Henry Durand, who was then living, was mentioned, it is said, in Holkar's memorial of 1870, "in highly unbecoming and objectionable terms". On the other hand, Sir Robert Hamilton, who, in the only official despatch on the subject, described Holkar's conduct on the 1st of July 1857, as admirable, and who traced the ultimate safety of British power in Central India to the personal fidelity of Holkar, is mentioned by the Ministerial subordinates of the Indian Foreign Office in terms that are beyond a doubt "highly unbecoming and objectionable". He is put down as a "notorious advocate" of Holkar "at home", whose "mischievous advocacy" is quite undeserving of credit. You have done all that bad taste and a bad case could prompt, to improve on this unprovoked insolence.

Sir Robert Hamilton is living, surrounded by children and grandchildren, and neither to him nor to them, it may be presumed, can his reputation be a matter of indifference.

You seem, by-the-by, to attach great importance to the fact, communicated to your father by Sir John Kaye, that the latter was "an intimate personal friend" of Sir Robert Hamilton. I was misled by the "my dear Sir" style of one or two notes I came across among Mr. Dickinson's papers into forming a different opinion, and expressed it hastily and, I regret to say, somewhat rudely, not in the book which has escaped "severe treatment" at your hands *because* you consider it "violent and acrimonious",* but in an unpublished paper, which you have probably seen. I owe an apology to you for this error—the only one of any description that you have helped me to correct—but the point itself is utterly insignificant. Sir John Kaye's careful impartiality is quite unimpeachable; while the positive, as well as the weightier negative, evidence of prejudice and calumny is drawn from Colonel Durand's own papers, not from anything that Sir Robert Hamilton could have supplied. The error of judgment that Kaye imputes to Colonel Durand in evacuating the Residency (absurdly exaggerated by you into the imputation of "an act of poltroonery"†) is, as you very justly observe, an "entirely separate matter" from Colonel Durand's "treatment of Holkar",‡ the real matter at issue. But, as you consider the question of intimacy to be important, I may as well mention that I have never seen Sir Robert Hamilton. When I was preparing the *Last Counsels* for the press I applied to him for information as to one or two facts; but, during the last seven years, I have had no correspondence or communication with him, or with any member of his family. It is not, therefore, as a personal friend, but simply as one who has always upheld those views of the position of the allied and protected States in the Indian Empire, upon which there was a substantial agreement between Sir John Kaye, Mr. Dickinson, and

* P. 476. † P. 475. ‡ P. 464.

Sir Robert Hamilton, that I undertake to defend the last-named gentleman from your reiterated suggestion that he was very wrong, and was deservedly censured by the Government of Lord Ellenborough for "the unauthorised elevation of young Tookajee Holkar" to the musnud of Indore. Sir Robert Hamilton, as you may see from his despatch to Lord Canning's Government of 1st February 1859,* has never acknowledged any error in this case. He was entirely in the right, and Lord Ellenborough's advisers were entirely in the wrong. The Government of India was saved by him for the time, and in a most momentous instance, from drifting into that stream of sham precedent, sham prerogative, and flagrant prevarication, which carried Lord Dalhousie into the disastrous policy of breaking up the Empire and constructing new departments. Sir Robert Hamilton was so well informed as to the law, custom, and precedents really applicable to Hindu successions, that he never suspected the perverse and grasping heresy propounded at Calcutta, until he found himself censured for not having fallen into it.

But you gentlemen of "the blue riband and stepping-stone" department, in defiance of statesmanlike instructions from home, in the face of Viceregal and departmental recantations, are perpetually relapsing into that same heresy—the heresy that sanctifies the extinction of allied States and the growth of salaried Commissions.

I have had good occasion to watch the sayings and doings of the Calcutta Foreign Office; and I declare that not one of those distinguished persons who have occupied the place of what you call "the right hand of the Viceroy" during the last twenty-five years, has ever been able to stick to a consistent principle on the subject of succession and annexation for a single year, or even through a single despatch. When the practical temptation of aggrandisement and patronage presents itself before the departmental mind, precept and principle give way at once.

You say that Sir Henry Durand was "decidedly op-

* *Return to the Lords* (77 of 1860), pp. 121, 123.

posed to the sweeping annexations of Lord Dalhousie, which, while they weakened our military position, had also unsettled the minds of our Indian feudatories, and sown fear and distrust broadcast".* Yet with reference to the only two actual cases that were proposed while he was at the head of the Foreign Office—those of Dhar and Mysore, most iniquitous and impolitic both of them —he was bitterly bent on annexation.

The retrogressive heresy that you accept as doctrine would cover a complete recurrence to the "sweeping annexations" of the Dalhousie reign of terror. "It would be extremely interesting," you say, "in face of all that has been talked and written by ignorant enthusiasts or paid agitators in England, to work out this question. There is hardly a great Native State in India which has not, strictly speaking, lapsed to the Crown; and under any other Government but that of England the majority of these States would long ago have been absorbed. By the English Government their existence has been artificially prolonged." This is totally erroneous, and exhibits complete ignorance on your part of the International law, the Indian law, and the Indian history, bearing on the question. It is totally untrue, and without the least political or historical foundation, that "the great Principalities of Gwalior, Indore, Jeypoor, and Baroda" have "lapsed to the Crown", or that "under any other Government but that of England these States would have been absorbed".†

The whole question of adoption, and of confirmation and investiture, has been so fully argued, and the iniquity of Lord Dalhousie's doctrine of "lapse" so thoroughly and unanswerably exposed by Mr. J. M. Ludlow,‡ and by myself,§ that I will only bring to your notice the candid

* P. 282. † P. 286.

‡ *Thoughts on the Policy of the Crown towards India* (Ridgway, 1859).

§ *Retrospects and Prospects of Indian Policy* (Trübner, 1868), pp. 10 to 26. See also an excellent pamphlet on "Adoption", by a distinguished gentleman now at Calcutta, the Hon. Vishwanath Narayun Mandlik, member of the Legislative Council, published in London by Smith, Elder, and Co. in 1866. Mr. Robert Knight, editor of the *Statesman*, has also exhausted the subject, from every point of view, with reference to estates as well as States.

confession of the Indian Government in Lord Canning's Adoption Despatch of April 30th, 1860, which contains (paragraphs 17, 19) the following passages :—

"We have not shown, so far as I can find, a single instance in which adoption by a Sovereign Prince has been invalidated by a refusal of assent by a Paramount Power."

"There is no example of any Hindoo State, whether in Rajpootana or elsewhere, lapsing to the Paramount Power, by reason of that Power withholding its assent to an adoption."

You say that the "connection" of the reigning Princes of Indore and Gwalior "with the former ruling family" —begging the question audaciously with that word "*former*"—"is very slight". You are quite mistaken. The present Maharajah Holkar of Indore is first cousin, the present Maharajah Scindia of Gwalior is "nearest in blood",* to his immediate predecessor. Both of them are descended in the male line from the common ancestor of *all* their predecessors. What more could you say, what more could you expect in any Royal family—our own, for example—of Europe or Asia ?

But I am wandering from my real object, already, I think, fully attained, that of clearing myself from the charge, which you do not attempt or "propose" to justify, of having published "a tissue of untruth". I really had not any intention, when I began this Letter, of carrying the war so far into the enemy's camp. I certainly had no intention, and have none, of denouncing your method as not being in harmony with the utterances and the style of those who have stood of late years at "the right hand of the Viceroy", and into whose place you may very naturally aspire to step in your turn. On the contrary, both your pamphlet and your book strike me as eminently characteristic of your department, and quite in keeping with the tone and manner of the very best official society in Calcutta. You say that you were "much tempted" to answer my book.† Well, you resisted the temptation, but you succumbed to another, far more excusable in your case than in that of Sir Charles Aitchi-

* *Succession by Adoption of Princes in India* (50 of 1850), pp. 37 and 88.

† P. 476.

son, and one of the besetting temptations of the class to which you belong. You thought more of the narrow circle in which you move, and of its petty maxims, than of the broad bounds of the Empire, and of the great principles on which its peace and stability depend. You thought more of the personal credit of your father—and here is the great excuse for you, and for you only—than of what you would, perhaps, call abstract justice. You have been relying too much on the dignity and security of Anglo-Indian officialism, on your big salaries and your sky-blue ribands. These things count for a great deal with Anglo-Indian functionaries and their parasites, but for very little with Imperial statesmen, or with intelligent citizens of the Empire, when once they are roused —no easy matter, I confess—to look into anything Indian.

You think that Mr. Dickinson's posthumous work will "die a natural death", and that more people will read your book than have "ever heard of Mr. Dickinson or his pamphlets".* It is possible that the establishment of "The John Dickinson Association" in London, and the names on its first Committee, may very soon convince you that here, also, you have made a great mistake.

You appear to imagine, in common with most of your official compeers, that the suggestion of an advocate being *paid*, is enough to destroy all the effect of his advocacy. "The cap fits!" Yes—you are quite right. I apply your indirect sarcasm, as you wished your readers to apply it, directly to myself. I am a half-pay officer, with no private means worth mentioning, and my large expenditure in advocating the redress of many Indian wrongs and the adoption of a liberal and truly Imperial policy, during the last twenty years,—with substantial and, as I believe, beneficial results,—has not come entirely from my own resources. I have done much unpaid work, and have seen myself in print much too often at my own cost. I am under the guidance and control of no one. But it has been very satisfactory to myself, and not devoid, I believe, of public advantage, when I

* P. 476.

have been able to combine literary and political work, and to obtain material aid from a publisher, or a client, or a fellow-worker. All that I claim is that my work has been conscientiously taken up and conscientiously performed. I have never accepted the position of advocate in a cause which I did not conceive to be at once just and capable of some settlement, and to have in it no element of hostility or mischief to the Empire. I have always aimed at scrupulous accuracy and moderation in all my statements and in all my arguments. I have, to the best of my judgment and ability, done my work well.

I have too often had to complain,—and never more often than with reference to the case now before us,—that the gentlemen of your department, although very handsomely paid, do their work badly. In the year 1870, Mr. Aitchison, "the right hand of the Viceroy", was receiving a salary of £4,000 a year. When he evolved from his inner consciousness the inaccurate statement that Holkar had played "a waiting game" for four days,* in contradiction to the records in his keeping, and thus misled Lord Mayo, I think he did his work badly. Judging by the standard I have set up for myself, it appears to me that in the month of August 1870 Mr. Aitchison's work was badly done, and his large salary not fairly earned.

If there is, indeed, no power in the Empire to redress the wrongs done in your Office and to improve the quality of its work in general, then my humble efforts as a critic and an advocate are entirely thrown away. But I do not yet despair of the commonwealth. There are latent forces in the Crown and in the constituencies that may wake us all up before long, and save the Empire from the selfish and stifling pressure of "the Office" and "the Service".

I have Sir, the honour to be,

Your most obedient servant,

EVANS BELL.

* *Ante*, pp. 41 to 44, and Appendix D.

APPENDIX.

A.

THE DURBAR.

(*Page* 14.)

The persons who formed the Durbar or Council at Indore, and with whom alone the Maharajah was in the habit of consulting in affairs of State, were (1) his own brother, Kashee Rao Holkar (K.C.S.I.); (2) his preceptor and Private Secretary, Oomed Singh; (3) the acting Dewan, Ramchunder Rao Bhao; (4) Bukhshee Khoman Singh, the Maharajah's fellow-student, Commandant of Cavalry (C.S.I.); (5) and Gunput Rao Seetaram, commonly called Gunesh Shastree, the Durbar Wakeel, or agent for daily communications with the British Resident. These five were all good English scholars, and during the two days of rebel ascendancy at Indore—2nd and 3rd July—actually became as much the objects of the mutineers' hate and fury as if they had been Europeans. Besides these there were (6) Bhowanee Singh Sir-nobut, head of the Household Horse; (7) Bhim-gir, head of police; and (8) Ram Rao Narain, the hereditary and titular Dewan. During Colonel Durand's retirement, their own observations and experience, and their inquiries at Mhow and Indore, convinced Major Hungerford and Captains Hutchinson and Elliott, as certified, for example, by Major Hungerford in a letter to Rao Oomed Singh, the Maharajah's Preceptor and Councillor, dated "Mhow, February 1st, 1858", that "the whole of the members of the Indore Durbar, during the time of the disturbances of the city, vied with the Maharajah in displaying feelings of unflinching loyalty and devotion to the British Government, even at a time when such feelings exposed them to great danger from a mutinous soldiery". All of the above-named members of the Durbar, with five other officers of rank at Holkar's Court, received "the cordial thanks" of the Governor-General for their "excellent services", "loyalty", and "assistance" given to the British Government [*Lords' Return* (77 of 1860), *Honours and Rewards*, pp. 119, 120, 125].

It may be said in extenuation of Colonel Durand's hasty suspicion and denunciation of the Indore Durbar, that he can have

known little of the character and qualifications of any of these gentlemen, with the exception of Gunput Rao Seetaram, the Durbar Wakeel, who afterwards accompanied him in the field and received a specific reward from our Government, for during the three months of his residence at Indore, he had only seen the Maharajah himself twice.

B.

LETTER OF THE VICEROY, EARL CANNING, TO SIR ROBERT HAMILTON, BART., K.C.B.

Which was read by the British Agent in the Indore Durbar.

(*Page* 17.)

"Calcutta, March 26, 1859.

"Dear Sir Robert,—This letter will catch you at Bombay, and I am sincerely sorry to think that it is the last which I shall address to you in India. Your departure is a great loss to the Government, and I only hope that it may be a proportionate gain to yourself in recruited strength and health.

"I had not much hope that the news which I telegraphed to you from the India House would detain you, and am not surprised at your decision.

"I wish that the rewards to Scindia and Holkar and the Nizam could have been settled before your departure, though with the latter you have nothing to do directly. It will require a strong influence to make all of them contented, and a new Governor-General's Agent will be at a disadvantage in this respect. There is not much difficulty about the Nizam. The difficulty is to reward Scindia and Holkar in due proportion to the Nizam without disturbing our Customs Line to an extent which we cannot afford, and without making over to their rule populations which have long been under ours. But the problem is nearly approaching to a solution, though not one which satisfies me.

"I do not see much difficulty about the Contingents; but we shall have to spend more money upon them.

"I have not been able to find your Memorandum upon military operations, respecting which you wrote some time ago. It was with me at Allahabad when I first went there, and possibly the Commander-in-Chief may have it. I have asked him, and will send it after you when I get hold of it.

"Do you think that there would be any gain in dividing the Central India Agency into two Agencies? This has been suggested, on the ground that the one is more than a single officer can properly manage. So far as regards having a chief officer at Scindia's Court, as well as at Holkar's, instead of a subordinate officer as at present, I like the proposal. The working of the Gwalior business through Indore is, on

urgent matters, a serious disadvantage; but in other respects I see no gain in it. Of course, the salary of each reduced Agency would be below that of Indore as it stands. Indeed, this will be diminished in the case of your successor, irrespectively of any division of duties.

"I have not forgotten your heavy losses in 1857; but your compensation must stand or fall with that of others. You have, I hope, a good chance of recovering a considerable portion.

"Good-bye, my dear Sir Robert, and once more accept my sincerest thanks for your indefatigable and valuable aid. I have received none that has been given with a more hearty willingness, I well know; and therefore there has been none which it has been more agreeable to me to accept.

"Believe me, etc.,

"(Signed) CANNING.

"There is a farewell despatch from the Governor-General in Council still to go to you.

"To Sir R. Hamilton, Bart. "(Signed) C."

C.

THE SECRET PAPERS.

(*Page* 36.)

The following note from Mr. John Dickinson's pen, evidently intended to have been inserted somewhere in that "Protest and Rejoinder" on behalf of the Maharajah Holkar which he did not live to finish, is necessary as a partial explanation of his access to records that are not usually brought to light.

"I must observe, as I shall have to quote a number of 'secret' papers in the course of my argument, that there was nothing dishonourable in the way these papers came into my possession, and therefore there is nothing dishonourable in my using them. I have always been perfectly frank and aboveboard in my dealings with the Government, whether friendly or hostile. I have defended them at my own cost and peril in cases where I thought they were right—as, for example, in their sharp struggle with the Indigo Planters, and in the matter of Her Majesty's assumption of the Imperial title,—and I have attacked them in the most public manner when they seemed to me to have been in error; so that when I attack, if the gates of the fort are opened to me by friends within, it is legitimate warfare for me to take advantage of it. When copies of documents which demonstrate the injustice with which Holkar has been treated, are freely given to me by a third party, I should be doing a great wrong to Holkar if I suppressed them."

The "secret" documents constitute in themselves a history of Holkar's remonstrance, and of the manner in which the Government of India was, on each successive occasion misinformed and misled. Copies of them have been placed in the British Museum and in the London Library.

D.

(*Page* 45.)

DEPUTATION TO MHOW ON THE NIGHT OF 1st JULY 1857.

Extract of Letter from Captain Hungerford to the Brigade Major, Saugor, No. 422, *dated Mhow, Fortified Square, 2nd July* 1857.

"6. At 9 p.m. last night, it was reported that an agent from Holkar had arrived to communicate with Colonel Platt, and had been stopped by the cavalry piquet stationed on the Indore Road."

The officer with the picquet was Major McMullen, afterwards Cantonment Magistrate at Mhow.

I have said (p. 45) that Mr. (now Sir Charles) Aitchison ought to have known that the Maharajah Holkar sent a deputation to Mhow on the very day of the outbreak, and that he did not wait till the 5th of July. Here is the proof of it.

No. 4207.

To Sir Robert N. C. Hamilton, Bart., Agent G.-G. for Central India. Foreign Department.

"Sir,—I am directed by the Governor-General in Council to forward for your information the accompanying copy of a letter from Captain T. Hungerford, Commanding Bengal Artillery, Mhow, dated 19 ultimo, No. 460, in which favourable mention is made of Gunnesh Seetaram Shastree, the Sudder Vakeel at Mhow of the Maharajah of Indore.

"I have, etc.,

"(Signed) G. F. Edmonstone,

"Secretary to the Government of India.

"Fort William, 13th October 1857."

No. 460.

To the Secretary to the Government of India, dated Mhow, 19th September 1857.

"Sir,—In my Report to your address I omitted to mention the services of Gunnesh Seetaram Shastree, the Sudder Vakeel at Mhow, on the part of H.H. the Maharajah of Indore.

"Almost all communications with the Durbar passed through the hands of the Vakeel, and I am much indebted to him for delivering them faithfully and promptly. On the night of the 1st July he came over to Mhow from Indore for the purpose of reporting what had occurred at Indore to the Officer Commanding the station, but unfortunately was stopped by a picquet on the Indore road, and the communications he then wished to make were not received. The Europeans saved at Indore when the massacre occurred received much kindness and attention at the hands of the Vakeel, and when they could be safely brought to Mhow, were conducted to the Fort by the Vakeel.

"The Maharajah will doubtless duly appreciate the services of his servant, but I beg to bring his services to the notice of Government, in the hope that, as he exerted himself ably and faithfully to aid communication between the Durbar and myself, the Government may be pleased to encourage an officer who has fulfilled his duties so well.

"(Signed) T. HUNGERFORD,
"Captain,
"Commanding Bengal Artillery, Mhow."

"True Copy.
"(Signed) W. R. SHAKESPEAR,
"Officiating 1st Assistant Agent G.-G. for C. I."

"Docket No. 765.

"Forwarded to Gunnesh Seetaram Shastree Vakeel for information by desire of Officiating Agent G.-G. for C. I. [Colonel H. M. Durand.]

"(Signed) W. R. SHAKESPEAR,
"Officiating 1st Assistant A. G.-G. for C. India.

"Indore Residency, Camp Mhow, 30th Octr. 1857."

Sir Robert Hamilton was then in Political charge with the Field Force under Sir Hugh Rose (Lord Strathnairn), and did not arrive at Indore until December 15th. The letter from the Government of India with its enclosure was consequently delivered to the Officiating Agent, Col. H. M. Durand. Thus it is certain that Colonel Durand was fully aware of the fact that on the night of the outbreak on the 1st of July 1857, Holkar sent a deputation to Mhow.